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ABSTRACT  
Shares in takeover target companies listed on the JSE have historically earned 
abnormal returns in the days preceding the public announcements of planned 
takeovers. This has not been tested since the enforcement of insider trading law 
in South Africa. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the existence of such abnormal 
returns occur as a result of legal market activity or if it infers illegal insider trading.  
The extent of Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“ACAR”) that occur in the 
21 days preceding the announcement of a takeover is established for a sample of 
57 takeovers that transpired between 2004 and 2014. ACAR establishes the 
average abnormal return that each takeover target company accumulates during 
the 21 day event window. 30 Personal Interviews offer insight into the causes of 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“CAR”) preceding each takeover announcement. 
Results indicate that shares in takeover target companies accumulate significant 
ACAR (9.03%) during the 21 trading days preceding the first public 
announcement of a takeover. Interview findings include the existence of plausible 
legal explanations for instances of CAR, which contradicts the suggestion that 
ACAR constitutes prima facie evidence of illegal insider trading. However, the 
study resolved that the occurrences of CAR were as a result of both legal market 
activity and illegal insider trading occurring after widespread information leaks. 
The existence of significant ACAR – more so than in previous South African 
studies – highlights the need for further investigation into the effectiveness of 
South African insider trading law in preventing illegal insider trading preceding the 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research is to establish whether illegal insider trading occurs 
prior to takeover announcements since the enforcement of insider trading laws in 
South Africa. 
The research will establish the extent to which shares in JSE-listed takeover 
target companies earn abnormal returns in the days preceding the public 
announcements of planned takeovers.  
The study will resolve whether the occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result 
of legal market activity or if they infer illegal insider trading. 
1.2 Context of the study 
The JSE (2013) explains that insider trading is discriminatory at its root, as it 
involves the information-privileged insider unfairly exploiting the majority who lack 
access to the same level of information. Ojah, Muhanji and Myburgh (2008) posit 
that insider trading renders financial markets inefficient on the grounds that 
outsiders demand compensation (additional risk premium) for their disadvantaged 
position, resulting in an increased cost of equity and less investment. 
In a study into the occurrence of insider trading in the New York Stock Exchange, 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found evidence of excess returns earned by 
investors in acquired firms prior to the first public announcements of planned 
mergers, concluding this to be indicative of insider trading. 
In a South African context, Bhana (1987, 1999) and Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) 
found evidence of illegal insider trading in shares of JSE-listed target companies 
preceding the announcement of takeovers for the periods 1976 – 1985; 1985 – 
1996 and 1998 – 2002 respectively. Myburgh and Davis (2004) explain that the 
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inability of the Companies Act (1973) to curtail insider trading lead to South Africa 
attaining a repute for widespread insider trading by the end of the 20th century.  
In 1997, a South African insider trading regime was established by the King Task 
Group. The insider trading regime lead to the Insider Trading Act (1998) 
supplanting the insider trading provisions of the Companies Act (1973). The 
provisions of the Insider Trading Act allowed for criminal prosecution and civil 
action, as well as empowering the Financial Services Board (FSB) to enforce the 
civil provisions. The civil provisions of the Insider Trading Act have since been 
enforced by the FSB, which has resulted in settlements totalling more than R93 
million (JSE, 2013)1. In 2004, the Security Services Act (2004) replaced the 
Insider Trading Act, resulting in a fine tuning and tightening up of the insider 
trading regulations in South Africa (Wilson, 2011)2. 
In an assessment into the impact that the insider trading regime had on conduct in 
the market in South Africa, Myburgh and Davis (2004, p.6) found a “striking 
change in the prevailing attitudes to insider trading, new policies and approaches 
among listed corporates and their advisors, and – according to most market 
participants – a sharp reduction in the perceived incidence of insider trading”. 
Similar qualitative findings from Ojah et al. (2008) were substantiated by their 
quantitative findings that the enforcement of insider trading legislation in the JSE 
had reduced the cost of equity and enhanced the efficiency of the market. 
Contrary to these findings, in a study into the occurrence of insider trading in the 
JSE during the period 2000 to 2005, van der Plaas (2007) found evidence of 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in the event window prior to the first public 
announcement of a merger or acquisition, concluding this to be indicative of 
insider trading. However, Ojah et al. (2008) suggested that their own findings 
were not as a result of the initiation of insider trading laws, but rather as a result of 
its enforcement thereafter. The 2000 to 2005 timing of the van der Plaas (2007) 
                                            
1
 A detailed list of Enforcement Actions taken by the FSB is available on their website 
https://www.fsb.co.za/enforcementCommittee/Pages/enforcementActions.aspx  
2
 Subsequently, the Financial Markets Act (2012) has repealed the Security Services Act (2004). 
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study may not have fully taken into account the enforcement of the insider trading 
regime3.  
In the latest South African study on the topic, Thaver and Ward (2011) did not find 
statistically significant abnormal trading volumes in the event window prior to the 
first public announcement of a merger or acquisition, concluding that insider 
trading was not endemic on the JSE.  
The conflicting conclusions drawn by van der Plaas (2007) with those drawn by 
Myburgh and Davis (2004), Ojah et al. (2008), and Thaver and Ward (2011) 
motivate further study in order to: 
i. Establish the extent to which shares in JSE-listed takeover target 
companies earn abnormal returns in the days preceding the public 
announcements of planned takeovers; and 
ii. Resolve whether the occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of 
legal market activity or if they infer illegal insider trading. 
1.3 Background to the research problem 
A background to the core concepts of the study provides an introduction to the 
research problem. The core concepts introduced and defined include: “insider 
trading”; “insider trading regime and insider trading laws”; “enforcement of insider 
trading laws”; “takeover”; “target company”; “acquiring company”; and “public 
announcement”. 
1.3.1 Insider trading 
The JSE (2013, p.4) explains that “the use of privileged information for the 
purposes of gain (or to avoid a loss) at the expense of others is morally and 
legally reprehensible. The eradication of this practice is essential to the efficient 
                                            
3
 The initiation of the insider trading regime occurred in 1998, with the promulgation of the Insider Trading Act (1998), and 
the enforcement of the civil provisions of the insider trading regime occurred in the years thereafter (1999 onwards). 
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working and reputation of any market, and the society in which it operates”. The 
Security Services Act (2004, s.72) defines insider trading as, “the buying or selling 
of a security by someone who has access to material, non-public information 
about the security”.  
The JSE (2013) explains that insider trading can either be legal, or illegal. Legal 
insider trading is trading by a registered insider who clears the trade with the 
relevant company, and declares the trade via the Stock Exchange News Service 
(“SENS”). Illegal insider trading is trading by anyone who is trading on the basis of 
price-sensitive inside information, regardless of the source of the inside 
information (Security Services Act, 2004).  
1.3.2 Insider trading regime and insider trading laws 
The South African laws regulating insider trading became increasingly insufficient 
as the economy matured in complexity (Myburgh & Davis, 2004). Prior to the 
enactment of the Insider Trading Act (1998), the offense was regulated according 
to the criminal provisions of the Companies Act (1973), necessitating guilt to be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt (JSE, 2013). Successful prosecution was 
therefore unlikely4. Given that no alternative civil remedies were available, insider 
trading became rife within the JSE (Myburgh & Davis, 2004). The deficiencies of 
the legal framework, predominantly concerning the onus of proof in a criminal trial 
and the lack of a civil remedy, played a major role in the initiation of the insider 
trading regime (JSE, 2013). 
The insider trading regime is a broad term that refers to the set of 
recommendations made by the King Task Group in 1997, and the subsequent 
legislation which implemented the recommendations i.e. the Insider Trading Act 
(1998) and then the Security Services Act (2004). This paper will use the term 
“insider trading laws” when referring to the insider trading regime and subsequent 
                                            
4
 There is no precedent in South African law of a criminal prosecution for illegal insider trading prior to the initiation of the 
insider trading regime (since the 1998 initiation the state has pursued eight criminal prosecutions against those accused of 
insider trading but no one has yet been convicted). 
- 5 - 
legislation initiated and enforced in South Africa. 
The initiation of the insider trading laws occurred in 1998, with the promulgation of 
the Insider Trading Act (1998), and the enforcement of the insider trading laws 
occurred in the years thereafter (1999 onwards). Ojah et al. (2008) explain that 
the enforcement of insider trading laws (and not their initiation) is what causes a 
reduction in illegal insider trading. The enactment of the Security Services Act 
(2004) provided a fine tuning of the insider trading regulation contained in the 
Insider Trading Act.  
In order to measure the prevalence of insider trading in the JSE since the 
enforcement of the insider trading laws one must allow enough time for the effects 
of enforcement to become measurable. Between 2000 and 2005, insider trading 
laws were still in the process of being enforced for the first time, and therefore the 
van der Plaas (2007) study drawing data from this period may not fully reflect the 
effects of the enforcement of insider trading laws. The proposed research allows 
for the effects of enforcement, and therefore uses a data collection period from 
01/07/2004 to 30/06/2014.  
1.3.1 Enforcement of insider trading laws 
The Financial Services Board (FSB) is empowered to combat illegal market 
activity, and can choose to act on reports (made by the Market Regulation 
Division of the JSE) of alleged insider trading activity (Myburgh & Davis, 2004). 
The civil provisions of the Insider Trading Act have since been utilised by the FSB, 
resulting in settlements since 1999 totalling more than R93 million5 (JSE, 2013). 
1.3.2 Takeover 
Chapter 5 (s.112 to s.114) of the Companies Act (2008) and Companies 
Amendment Act (2011) defines “fundamental transactions, takeovers and offers” 
                                            
5
 Enforcement Actions taken by the FSB are available on their website: 
https://www.fsb.co.za/enforcementCommittee/Pages/enforcementActions.aspx 
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as a “transaction that would fundamentally alter a company, including the disposal 
of substantially all of its assets or undertaking, a scheme of arrangement, or a 
merger or amalgamation”.  
A takeover includes: “mergers between listed entities; the acquisition of a 
significant stake in a company listed on the JSE; the buy-out of minority 
shareholders; and a leveraged buy-out of a listed company” (Smit & Ward, 2007: 
p.5).  
1.3.3 Target and acquiring company 
Both Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) and Smit and Ward (2007) refer to a target 
company as a listed company that is the target for acquisition in a takeover (i.e. 
the company to be acquired). Both authors define an acquiring company as the 
company which announces the intention to acquire a significant stake (in excess 
of 10%) of the ordinary shares of a target company. 
1.3.4 Public announcement 
Section 3.4(a) of the JSE listing requirements outlines the requirements for a 
listed company in managing confidential and price-sensitive information. Price-
sensitive information must be announced via the Stock Exchange News Service 
(SENS) in order for it to be classified as public information (and such information 
is confidential until such a time as it is published via SENS). Section 3.5 of the 
JSE listing requirements states that, “any information to be announced in terms of 
paragraph 3.4 may not be released, a) during JSE trading hours, until after it has 
been released on SENS, or b) outside of JSE trading hours, until arrangements 
have been made for the information to be approved and published before the 
opening of the JSE on the next business day”.  
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1.4 Problem statement 
1.4.1 Main problem 
Shares in JSE-listed takeover target companies have historically earned abnormal 
returns in the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers. 
This has not been tested since the enforcement of insider trading laws in South 
Africa. Furthermore, it is unclear whether such abnormal returns are as a result of 
legal market activity or if they infer illegal insider trading. 
The problem statement can be broken down into two sub-problems: 
1.4.2 Sub-problem 1 
The extent of abnormal returns earned by shares in JSE-listed takeover target 
companies in the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers 
has not been determined since the enforcement of insider trading laws in South 
Africa.  
1.4.3 Sub-problem 2 
It is unclear whether abnormal returns in the days preceding the public 
announcements of takeovers occur as a result of legal market activity or they infer 
illegal insider trading. 
1.5 Research objectives 
1.5.1 (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
In relation to the first sub-problem, this study seeks to establish the extent to 
which shares in JSE-listed takeover target companies earn abnormal returns in 
the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers. 
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1.5.2 (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
In relation to the second sub-problem, this study seeks to resolve whether the 
occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of legal market activity or if they 
infer illegal insider trading.  
1.6 Significance of the study 
The study builds on existing research on insider trading in three areas: 1. the 
extent of abnormal returns preceding takeover announcements; 2. the cause of 
abnormal returns preceding takeover announcements; and 3. the prevalence of 
illegal insider trading in the JSE since the enforcement of insider trading laws in 
South Africa.  
In addition it may offer guidance to regulatory bodies, and the investment banks 
and legal firms involved in takeovers. The emerging market context of the South 
African scope of the study may offer a contribution towards other emerging 
markets with equally or less developed financial and legal systems. 
1.7 Delimitations of the study 
The following delimitations have been applied to the study: 
i. Excluded from the scope of the study are events (other than takeovers) which 
could result in abnormal returns. Examples of such events include: 
- Corporate activity including rights offers and accelerated book builds; 
- Change in a key personnel (i.e. change in a director); 
- Scheduled earnings and dividend announcements; 
- Major investment or disinvestment. 
ii. The study focuses on insider trading of shares in target companies involved in 
takeovers, and excludes from its scope the insider trading of shares of the 
acquiring company. Research has found that there is a lack of evidence of 
significant  short term abnormal returns to shareholders of the acquiring 
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companies, and therefore less incentive for insiders to trade shares in the 
acquiring company for speculative gain (Asquith, Bruner & Mullins, 1983; 
Affeck-Graves, Flack & Jacobson, 1988; Franks, Harris & Titman, 1991; Fuller, 
Netter & Stegemoller, 2002; Smit & Ward, 2007).  
iii. Excluded from the scope of this study are takeovers that occurred in the JSE 
during the years preceding 1 July 2004. The time frame for the study is the 10 
year period from 01 July 2004 to 30 June 2014. This study seeks to resolve 
the prevalence of illegal insider trading in the JSE since the enforcement of 
insider trading laws, hence the time frame of this study allowing enough time 
for the enforcement of the insider trading laws to be reflected in the data.  
iv. Excluded from the scope of the study is the test for abnormal trading volumes 
of both ordinary shares and derivatives of the target company. Thaver (2009) 
found that abnormal trading volumes preceding a price-sensitive 
announcement provide a robust indicator of insider trading activities and van 
der Plaas (2007) suggested that abnormal trading in derivative instruments 
could also shed further light into illegal insider trading. This study has excluded 
these aspects from the scope of the study. 
1.8 Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made regarding the study: 
i. A takeover in which the target company was acquired for less than a 10% 
premium is not as likely to attract insider trading as those acquired for a 10% 
premium or more. Based on this assumption the sample excludes takeovers in 
which less than a 10% premium was paid. The rationale of this is informed by 
Smit and Ward (2007), Ascioglu and Wood (2002) and van der Plaas (2007) 
who made similar assumptions based on the same rationale: if there is no or 
little premium paid for the target company then there is no or little price 
sensitive information for investors to react to. 
ii. The study constitutes two sub-problems and associated objectives which are 
researched in a sequential basis: Firstly, to establish the extent of abnormal 
returns in the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers; 
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and secondly – assuming that abnormal returns are identified – to resolve 
whether the abnormal returns occur as a result of legal market activity or if it 
infers illegal insider trading. Should there be zero occurrence of abnormal 
returns then the second sub-problem will not be researchable. The literature 
suggests there is little change of this occurring (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981; 
Bhana, 1987; Bhana, 1999; Mushidzhi and Ward, 2004; and van der Plaas, 
2007). 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The first section of the review, labelled “Extent of Abnormal Returns”, pertains to 
the first research objective, which is to establish the extent to which shares in 
JSE-listed takeover target companies earn abnormal returns in the days 
preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers. A review of the 
following four theoretical foundations of the first research objective contextualises 
the first hypothesis: 
i. A review of literature in relation to the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” 
introduces the notion that share prices reflect public information.  
ii. A review of the literature in relation to the “Capital Asset Pricing Model” 
introduces the theory that expected share returns are a factor of market 
returns and the systematic risk of an asset. 
iii. A review of the literature in relation to “Event Studies” introduces the 
methodology used to test for market efficiency and abnormal returns. 
iv. A review of the literature in relation to “abnormal returns preceding the 
announcement of a takeover” introduces the studies which demonstrate 
that takeover related information is often priced into the share price of the 
target company prior to its public announcement. 
The second section of the review, labelled “Cause of Abnormal Returns”, pertains 
to the second research objective, which is to resolve whether the occurrences of 
abnormal returns are as a result of legal market activity or if they infer illegal 
insider trading. A review of the following two theoretical foundations of the second 
research objective contextualises the second hypothesis: 
i. A review of the literature in relation to “abnormal returns and legal market 
activity” introduces the studies which reason that occurrences of abnormal 
returns preceding a takeover announcement can be explained by legal 
market activity; and 
- 12 - 
ii. A review of the literature in relation to “abnormal returns and illegal insider 
trading” introduces the studies which reason that occurrences of abnormal 
returns preceding a takeover announcement infer illegal trading of price-
sensitive inside information. 
2.1 (1) Extent of Abnormal returns 
2.1.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
Fama (1970, p.1) states that “a market in which prices always fully reflect 
available information is called efficient”. Jensen (1978, p.4) defines EMH as 
follows: “A market is efficient with respect to an information set if it is impossible to 
make profits by trading on the basis of the information.” The EMH holds that, apart 
from noise trading related fluctuations6, changes in share prices occur as a result 
of investors pricing new information into the value of share (Fama, 1965).   
The idea of an EMH was formally introduced by Fama (1965) who built on the 
work of Bachelier (1914) and Osborne (1959). Fama (1965) demonstrated that 
successive price changes in individual securities are independent random 
variables following a random walk as opposed to being dependent on past prices. 
The author reasoned that the price of a share is reflective of its implicit 
fundamental value, which depends on the earning potential of the firm. He further 
reasoned that fundamental values can change over time as a result of new 
information related to a factor which could impact the company’s prospects. He 
concludes that “a situation where successive price changes are independent is 
consistent with the existence of an efficient market for securities, that is, a market 
where, given the available information, actual prices at every point in time 
represent very good estimates of intrinsic values” (Fama, 1965: p. 90). 
                                            
6
 Fama (1965) explains that noise trading is trading that occurs as a result of investor uncertainty and disagreement on 
fundamental values of a share (as opposed to trading activity based on the impact of new information on the perceived 
fundamental value of a share). 
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Fama (1970; 1991) subsequently described three empirical tests for market 
efficiency, namely (1) weak-form tests for return predictability (degree to which 
past returns predict future returns), (2) semistrong-form event studies (the speed 
in which security prices reflect public information announcements), and (3) strong-
form tests for private information (the amount of private information not fully 
reflected in market prices).  
i. Weak-form efficiency: 
Weak-form efficiency suggests share prices exhibit no sequential dependency as 
they already reflect historical information (Fama, 1970). Jensen (1968, p.163) 
explains that under weak-form efficiency, “forecasting techniques which only use 
the sequence of past prices to forecast future prices are doomed to failure”, and 
that “the best forecast of future price is merely the present price plus the normal 
expected return over the period”.   
Providing evidence in support of weak-form efficiency, Fama (1970) cites the 
findings of Fama (1965), which demonstrate that successive price changes in 
individual securities are independent random variables following a random walk.  
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) used the contrarian7 investment strategy to 
challenge weak-form market efficiency. The authors found that shares identified 
as the largest underperformers (over performers) over 5 years are more likely to 
experience underperformance (over performance) relative to the market in 
subsequent years. They interpret these results in lieu of behavioural finance 
(market overreaction to significant negative or positive news). Zarowin (1989) and 
Chan and Chen (1991, p.39) challenge this interpretation, arguing that “there is a 
risk factor associated with the relative economic performance of firms (a 
distressed-firm effect) that is compensated in a rational equilibrium pricing model”.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 2001) challenge weak-form efficiency on the 
grounds that momentum investors cause prices to temporarily move away from 
                                            
7
 Contrarian investment strategy is “an investment style that goes against prevailing market trends by buying assets that 
are performing poorly and then selling when they perform well” (DeBondt and Thaler, 1987: p. 32). 
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their fundamental values. The authors found that trading strategies which buy 
(sell) shares that have performed well (poorly) in the past generate abnormal 
returns over a 3-12 month period, after which returns revert to market equilibrium. 
ii. Semistrong-form efficiency: 
Semistrong-form efficiency asserts that stock prices reflect all available public 
information (Fama, 1970). Jensen (1978) explains that semistrong-form efficiency 
implies that share prices rapidly adjust to publicly available new information, such 
that no excess returns can be earned by trading on that information.  
In line with semistrong-form efficiency, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) find 
that the information in stock splits pertaining to the firm’s future dividend pay-outs 
is, on average, fully reflected in the price of a split share at the time of the split.  
In a review of the literature in relation to empirical tests for semistrong-form 
efficiency, Jensen (1978) cites various studies which are either consistent or in 
conflict with the semistrong-form of market efficiency. For example, the author 
cites the findings of Charest (1978a) – which demonstrate that the impact of stock 
splits on share prices are consistent with semistrong-form efficiency8 – and 
contrasts these findings to those of Charest (1978b), which demonstrate that the 
market price reaction to changes in dividends are inconsistent with semistrong-
form efficiency. Jensen (1978) concluded that rather than conclusively disproving 
or proving forms of market efficiency, the studies collectively serve to highlight the 
inadequacies in the state of knowledge. 
In an attempt to redefine rather than destroy EMH, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
argue that because information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the 
information which is available, since if it did, those who spend resources to obtain 
it would receive no compensation. The authors purport an EMH in which there is 
an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium, such that prices reflect the information of 
                                            
8
 See also Jensen (1968) where he found the prices of securities capture the effects of all currently available information. 
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informed investors; but only partially, so that those who expend resources to 
obtain information do receive compensation.  
In reviews of semistrong-form event studies, Fama (1991; 1998) concludes that 
while some event studies suggest that stock prices do not respond quickly to 
specific information, the majority demonstrate that the adjustment of stock prices 
to new firm-specific events is efficient. 
iii. Strong-form efficiency: 
Strong-form efficiency asserts that stock prices reflect all information, both public 
and non-public (Fama, 1970). Under strong-form efficiency, insider information 
would need to be fully exploited by insiders in order for non-public information to 
be reflected in the price of a share (Jensen, 1978). Jensen (1978) explains that 
strong-form efficiency is an extreme form which offers a logical completion to the 
set of possible hypothesis but that few authors have ever treated it as anything 
other than that. Fama (1991; 1998) describes the methodological challenges 
associated with strong-form tests (the joint-hypothesis problem). He explains that 
the joint-hypothesis problem can result in measured abnormal returns which occur 
either as a result of market inefficiency (as hypothesised) or merely as a result of 
an imperfect market equilibrium asset pricing model9.  
2.1.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The traditional form10 for capital asset pricing set forth by Sharpe (1964)11 and 
Lintner (1965) form the foundations of CAPM, and have been widely used12 in 
                                            
9
 Fama (1991; 1998) explains that the joint-hypothesis problem is greatly diminished in semi-strong form event studies 
which serve to quantify the impact of an event on the daily share price. This is explained in greater detail in CH3 of this 
study. 
10
 Sharpe (1964, p. 438) labelled it the “diagonal model”; Black et al. (1972, p.3) referred to it as the Sharpe-Lintner “mean-
variance formulation” or the “traditional model”; while Fama (1968) simply referred to it as the market model. 
11
 CAPM was independently introduced and developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) and later the 
contribution of the unpublished work of Treynor (1961, 1962) was recognised by French (2003). William Sharpe was 
awarded the 1990 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences partially in recognition of his contribution toward the 
development of CAPM. 
12
 As of September 2014, the authors Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) have been cited in peer reviewed journal articles a 
total of 13,525 and 8,187 times respectively. 
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capital asset pricing and calculating expected returns of securities, and of 
portfolios13 (Fama & French, 1993; 2004).  
Markowitz (1952) pioneered quantifying the relationship between risk and return, 
and promoted the measurement of the effects of diversification and the limits 
thereof. Tobin (1958) extended the work of Markowitz (1952) through introducing 
a risk-free asset to portfolio allocation. Building on Markowitz (1952) and Tobin 
(1958), Sharpe (1964, p. 438) introduced the “diagonal model” as a model for 
market equilibrium. Simply stated, the model purports a linear relationship 
between the returns on any security and a general market factor (Jensen, 1969). 
After Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) initially misinterpreted the alignment of 
their models, Fama (1968) subsequently demonstrated that their models 
represent equivalent approaches to the problem of capital asset pricing under 
uncertainty. 
The traditional Sharpe-Lintner form of the capital asset pricing model states that 
the expected excess return on an asset is equal to its level of systematic risk () 
multiplied by the expected excess return on the market portfolio. That is, prices of 
assets (in capital market equilibrium) adjust such that: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗) = 𝐸(𝑟𝑚)𝛽𝑗                                                               (1) 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗)  = the expected excess return on asset j; 
𝐸(𝑟𝑚)  = the expected excess return on the market portfolio; 
𝛽𝑗   = the systematic risk of asset j. 
The main result of the model is a statement of the relation between the systematic 
risk of individual assets and their expected risk premiums (Jensen, 1969). 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) provide evidence which demonstrates that the 
expected excess returns on an asset is not strictly proportional to its level of 
                                            
13
 Treynor (1965); Sharpe (1966) and notably Jensen (1968; 1969) demonstrated that CAPM can further be used to 
determine expected portfolio returns. 
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systematic risk. The authors found that excess returns on high- (low-) assets 
are lower (higher) than the traditional form of the model suggests. They reject the 
traditional form of the model and instead indicate that the expected return on an 
asset is better represented by the “Black CAPM”14 two-factor model15: 
     𝐸(𝑟𝑗) =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑗  [𝐸(𝑟𝑚) −  𝑟𝑓]                                                    (2) 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗)   = the expected return on asset j 
𝑟𝑓   = the return on the risk-free asset 
𝐸(𝑟𝑚)   = the expected return on the market portfolio 
𝛽𝑗    = systematic risk of j relative to the market portfolio. 
In their review of the empirical soundness of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and the 
two-factor Black CAPM, Fama and French (2004) cite various early studies16 
which empirically reject the former and accept the latter.  
Subsequent research began to uncover cracks in both the traditional and Black 
CAPM through identifying variables like size (Banz, 1981); various price ratios 
(Basu, 1977); leverage (Bhandari, 1988)17; and momentum (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993)18 that add to the explanation of average returns provided by beta. 
Fama and French (1992; 1996) confirm that size, earnings-price, debt-equity and 
book-to-market ratios add to the explanation of expected stock returns provided 
by market beta. 
Fama and French (1993; 1996) propose a three-factor model for expected 
returns. They find that the model captures much of the variation in average return 
for portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and other price ratios that 
                                            
14
 The Black CAPM refers to the two-factor model introduced by Black et al. (1972). 
15
 Black et al. (1972) relaxed the assumption of availability of riskless borrowing and lending opportunities in order to 
formulate the two-factor model. 
16
 See Fama and French (1993). 
17
 Bhandari (1988: p.36) finds that “high debt-equity ratios (book value of debt over the market value of equity, a measure of 
leverage) are associated with returns that are too high relative to their market betas”. 
18
 See Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
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cause problems for the CAPM. The superiority of this method in estimating 
expected terms over a longer period is well documented in the literature (Fama 
and French, 2004).  
However, the majority of existing studies which measure expected returns during 
a short-term event window use either the traditional market model or the two-
factor Black CAPM (Fama, 1991; MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1998)19 – the reasons 
being (1) that it is not necessary to complicate the model for estimating short term 
expected returns, and (2) the Fama-French three-factor model uses constructed 
indices applicable to equity markets in the United States of America, and as such 
would need to be re-constructed for application in other markets. Fama (1991) 
uses the example of takeovers to reason that in instances where a large premium 
for the target share is offered, then the chosen model for calculating expected 
returns has little impact on the finding of abnormal returns. The author explains 
that when, for example, a 15% premium for the target shares is offered, then the 
finding of significant abnormal returns has little chance of being affected by the 
choice of model given that the mean-average daily return on equities is normally 
only about 0.04%20.  
 
A theme in South African equity market research involves the idea that resource 
and industrial shares in South Africa are dichotomous. Various authors (Gilbertson 
& Goldberg, 1981; Bowie & Bradfield, 1993; Van Rensburg & Slaney, 1997; 
Correia and Uliana, 2004) have found evidence of such market segmentation.  
 
Bowie and Bradfield (1993, 1997) explain that the strong influence of resources 
shares on the JSE has complicated the use of the CAPM in South Africa, and as 
such, broad sectorial indices should be used as market proxies instead of the All 
Share Index. The authors find that the error in predicting expected returns (when 
using CAPM) is dramatically reduced when sectorial indices are used in place of 
                                            
19
 Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) and van der Plaas (2007) employ the traditional and / or two-
factor Black-CAPM during a short term event window.  
20
 10% per year divided by 250 trading days. 
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the All Share Index. Van Rensburg and Slaney (1997), Van Rensburg (2002), 
Correia and Uliana (2004), Kruger and Van Rensburg (2008), and Strugnell, 
Gilbert and Kruger (2011) similarly compared the accuracy of the CAPM in 
estimating expected returns when using the All Share Index and the various 
sectorial indices. These authors agree that despite CAPM shortcomings, the use 
of broad sectorial indices as market proxies offer an increased accuracy in 
predicting expected returns.  
2.1.3 Event studies 
Binder (1998) explains that the methodology for a typical event study draws on 
efficient market theory and asset pricing to assess and analyse the impact of new 
information on security prices and returns. 
MacKinlay (1997) provides a historical overview of the use of event study 
methodology in finance and economic studies, referring to Dolley (1933) as the 
first to employ the methodology through his examination of the price effects of 
stock splits. The author references Myers & Bakay (1948), Barker (1956, 1957, 
1958), and Ashley (1962) as authors who further advanced event studies during 
the 1930s until the 1960s. The author cites influential papers by Ball & Brown 
(1968) and Fama et al. (1969) who first presented the methodology that is still 
used today.  
i. Ball and Brown (1968): 
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to provide evidence showing that share 
prices react to the release of annual financial statements. The study provides 
evidence that these announcements convey new information to investors.  
The authors used a Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model to quantify expected returns for 
each share. Abnormal share returns were calculated by subtracting the expected 
return from actual return: 
 𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 =  𝑟𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑟𝑗𝑡)                                               (4) 
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Where: 
𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡   = the abnormal return on share j in time t 
𝑟𝑗𝑡  = is the actual return observed on share j in time t 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗𝑡)  = is the return on the market predicted by the CAPM model in time t 
ii. Fama et al. (1969): 
Binder (1998, p.111) refers to the Fama et al. (1969) paper as a classic that 
“started a methodological revolution in accounting and economics” given that their 
event study methodology has “become the standard method of measuring 
security price reaction to some announcement or event”. 
Fama et al. (1969) utilized stock splits as an event in order to test the speed at 
which stock prices adjust to the new stock split information. The authors use a 
traditional CAPM-based market model to determine the expected returns of a 
stock, and then quantify the abnormal returns associated with an event through 
establishing the residual returns. The residual returns are the difference between 
expected returns and realised returns, as per (4). 
iii. Modifications to event study methodology: 
MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998) outline the modifications to the methodology 
developed in Ball & Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) that have since been 
applied in event studies.  The largest modifications to event studies have been in 
relation to the improvements to CAPM and its use in estimating expected returns 
over longer event windows (Binder, 1998).  
Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) outline complications and adjustments to the 
original event study methodology, based on their considerations of 
implementation issues for data sampled at monthly and daily intervals. The 
authors reason that their findings reinforce the view that the use of daily data is 
straightforward (in terms of the way one estimates daily expected returns). 
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McWilliams and Siegel (1997) adjust for confounding events through omission of 
data that could be exposed to confounding events, which include any information 
that could have a material impact on the share price of the target company. 
2.1.4 Abnormal returns preceding takeover announcements 
A plethora of studies have demonstrated that a takeover announcement is likely to 
have a significant price impact on shares of the target company (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Ascioglu et al., 2002; Keown & Pinkerton, 
1981; Sanders & Zdanowicz, 1992; Mushidzhi & Ward, 2004; and Arnold et al., 
2006).  
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found evidence of significant excess returns earned 
in acquired firms prior to the first public announcement of the planned mergers. 
Jayaraman, Mandelker and Shastri (1991) similarly found that shareholders of 
target companies earn significant excess returns over a period of 20 days 
preceding the announcement. Similar results were found by Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985), Dennis and McConnell (1986), and Jarrel and Poulsen (1989). 
Bhana (1987) uses a sample of 64 takeovers of JSE-listed companies between 
1976 and 1985 and finds that shareholders of the acquired firms earn significant 
abnormal returns in the 15 days preceding the announcement of the takeover. 
Bhana (1999) similarly uses a sample of 97 takeovers21 of JSE-listed companies 
between 1985 and 1996 and finds that shareholders of the acquired firms earn 
significant22 abnormal returns the day before the takeover announcement. 
Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) use a sample of 49 takeovers of JSE-listed 
companies between 1998 and 2002 and demonstrate that shareholders of target 
                                            
21
 97 out of 136 formed the “No News” sample, meaning the transactions were not in the news before they were 
announced. 
22
 Significant at the 1% level using a t-test 
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firms earn significant23 abnormal returns the day before the takeover 
announcement. 
In a later South African study using a sample of 30 takeovers in the JSE from 
2000 to 2005, van der Plaas (2007) similarly demonstrates evidence of significant 
cumulative abnormal returns from a sample of 30 takeovers in a 21 day pre-
announcement event window. 
2.1.5 First Hypothesis 
H0: ACAR = 0.  
The null hypothesis states that shares in takeover target companies accumulate 
no significant Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“ACAR”) during the 21 
trading days preceding the first public announcement of the takeover. 
H1: ACAR > 0.  
The alternative hypothesis states that shares in takeover target companies 
accumulate significant ACAR during the 21 trading days preceding the first public 
announcement of the takeover. 
                                            
23
 Significant at the 5% level using a t-test 
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2.2 (2) Cause of abnormal returns 
The literature is divided as to the cause of abnormal returns preceding the 
announcement of a takeover. The plethora of analysis on the subject can be divided into 
two broad categories: those that ascribe abnormal returns to legal market activity and 
those that ascribe abnormal returns to illegal insider trading. 
2.2.1 Abnormal returns and legal market activity 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that over 85% of abnormal returns preceding the 
announcement of the planned takeover can be attributed to public information, and 
conclude that abnormal returns preceding an announcement in the form of aggregate 
run-up statistics must be used cautiously as a measure for illegal insider activity. 
Comment (1986) similarly points out that the prospect of large takeover premiums and 
the many kinds of clues legally available to market participants assures the existence of 
an active market for trading based on prospective takeover targets. 
Gupta and Misra (1988) found that illegal insider trading is not a significant contributor to 
the run-up in the share price of a target company preceding the announcement of a 
planned takeover. Their findings were based on comparing pre-announcement price run-
ups in the seven month period before and after the high profile Dennis Levine insider 
trading case of May 1986. Their findings were based on the assumption that price run-up 
patterns should have changed in the seven month period after the case (if these price 
run-ups were a result of illegal insider trading) given the sentiment and fear in the market 
at the time. 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) investigated a sample of 172 successful take-overs on the 
NYSE between 1981 and 1985. The authors argue that, contrary to the insider trading 
theory, the occurrence of abnormal returns preceding the announcement of a takeover 
are consistent with capital markets anticipating the acquisition of a target firm rather than 
insider trading. The authors concluded, “Our results indicate that the presence of 
rumours in the news media concerning an impending bid is the strongest variable in 
explaining unanticipated premiums and pre-bid run-up for tender targets” (Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989, p.244).  
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De Long, Schleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) suggest that abnormal returns 
(preceding the announcement of the price-sensitive information) can be explained, at 
least partially, by the presence of noise traders. The authors describe noise traders as 
“positive feedback investors (trend chasers) who buy securities when prices rise and sell 
when prices fall” (p. 12). The authors purport that the existence of target company 
abnormal returns (preceding the announcement of the price-sensitive information) may 
be due to purchases by insiders, while subsequent abnormal returns are influenced by 
trend-chasing noise traders. 
Bhana (1999) investigated a sample of 136 JSE listed companies which were the targets 
of takeover bids during the period 1985 to 1996. The author acknowledges the 
perception that lawful speculation is dwarfed by unlawful trading on inside information, 
but purports that the majority of share trading that occurs prior to price-sensitive 
announcements is attributable to a functional market and not automatically insider 
trading. The author finds that “the market identifies potential takeover target companies 
prior to the first public announcement”, concluding that “insider trading is not, on 
average, a significant contributor to abnormal returns preceding the announcement of 
the planned takeover” (p. 32). 
Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) interpreted their finding of significant abnormal returns in the 
days preceding the announcement of a takeover as an opportunity for further research, 
i.e. the results “could be used to explore the possibility of insider trading after the 
leakage of acquisition information before it is announced to the public” (p. 24). 
2.2.2 Abnormal returns and illegal insider trading 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found that the results of their study imply the incidence of 
substantial amounts of trading based on insider information. Their study examines the 
impact of trading in inside information in the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) in 
advance of planned takeover announcements by focussing on the daily stock price 
movements of 194 successfully acquired firms between 1975 and 1978. The authors 
based their conclusions on the assumption that “abnormal price movements can be 
interpreted as prima facie evidence of the market’s reaction to information in advance of 
its public announcement” (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981, p.1).  
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A relevant quote by the industry practitioner J. William Robinson, in a paper by Keown 
and Pinkerton (1981, p.3), sums up the practical basis upon which their assumption is 
made, “You start with a handful of people, but when you get close to doing something 
the circle expands pretty quickly. You have to bring in directors, two or three firms of 
lawyers, investment bankers, and everybody’s got a secretary. If the deal is a big one, 
you might need a syndicate of banks to finance it. Every time you let in another person, 
the chance of a leak increases geometrically.” 
In a later study, Keown, Pinkerton, Young, and Hansen (1985) found similar results when 
comparing abnormal returns from a control sample with those from a sample of 
takeovers in which insider trading prosecution had taken place.  
Jayaraman, Mandelker and Shastri (1991) found that shares in takeover target 
companies earn significant abnormal returns during a 20 day period prior to a takeover 
announcement, and interpreted this to be indicative of insider trading. 
Bhana (1987) investigated the role of insider trading related to takeovers of target 
companies listed on the JSE during the period 1976 to 1985. The author interpreted his 
findings to suggest that insiders appear to take market positions on prospective 
takeovers approximately 40 trading days before the public announcement, concluding 
that leakage of inside information occurs at a significant level in the 15 trading days 
preceding the public announcement. 
In a later study into the occurrence of insider trading in the JSE during the period 2000 to 
2005, the author van der Plaas (2007) found evidence of cumulative abnormal returns in 
the event window prior to the first public announcement of a merger or acquisition. He 
interprets the results as evidence of illegal insider trading: “The overall conclusion from 
this research report into insider trading in the shares of target companies is that such 
trading does occur, especially in the days immediately before a public announcement” 
(van der Plaas, 2007, p. 51).  
2.2.3 Second Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis states that illegal insider trading is not the only explanation for 
cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement. 
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The alternative hypothesis states that illegal insider trading is the only explanation for 
cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement. 
2.3 Conclusion of Literature Review  
The first section of the review pertains to the first research objective, which is to establish 
the extent to which shares in JSE-listed takeover target companies earn abnormal 
returns in the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers. 
This second section of the review pertains to the second sub-problem, which is to 
resolve whether occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of legal market activity 
or if they imply illegal insider trading.  
The first hypothesis is defined as follows: 
H0: ACAR = 0. The null hypothesis states that shares in takeover target companies 
accumulate no significant Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“ACAR”) during the 21 
trading days preceding the first public announcement of the takeover. 
H1: ACAR > 0. The alternative hypothesis states that shares in takeover target 
companies accumulate significant ACAR during the 21 trading days preceding the first 
public announcement of the takeover. 
The second hypothesis is defined as follows: 
The null hypothesis states that illegal insider trading is not the only explanation for 
cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement. 
The alternative hypothesis states that illegal insider trading is the only explanation for 
cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
The purists of quantitative research (Popper, 1959; Ayer, 1966; Schrag, 1992; Maxwell & 
Delaney, 2004) articulate assumptions that are consistent with what is commonly called 
a positivist or post-positivist philosophy. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) expound that 
quantitative purists maintain that social science inquiry should be objective. Positivism 
and post-positivism are thus based on the use of experimental methodology in pursuit of 
objective truth (Philips and Burbules, 2000). Robson (2002) explains that positivists and 
post-positivists pursue objectivity while recognizing the possible effects of biases and 
human conjectures. Researchers employing quantitative methodologies have 
traditionally called for rhetorical neutrality, formal writing style, impersonal passive voice, 
and technical terminology (Tashakkori & Teddie, 1998, 2010). 
On the opposite end of the paradigm spectrum, the purists of qualitative research (Smith, 
1983, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Schwandt, 2000) reject 
positivism and argue for the superiority of constructivism, idealism, relativism, humanism, 
and hermeneutics. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) expound that qualitative purists 
believe that it is impossible to fully differentiate causes and effects, and that logic flows 
from specific to general (i.e. explanations are generated inductively from the data). Guba 
& Lincoln (1989) describe qualitative research as that which is often characterised by a 
detailed, empathic, and informal writing style. 
These two dominant research paradigms have resulted in two distinct research cultures, 
“one [qualitative] is professing the superiority of ‘deep, rich observational data’ and the 
other [quantitative] the virtues of ‘hard, generalizable data’” (Sieber, 1973: p. 1335). 
Triangulating data sources was established as a means for seeking convergence across 
qualitative and quantitative methods in order to have biases inherent in any single 
method diminished by the use of a mixed method approach (Jick, 1979). Greene, 
Caracelli, & Graham (1989) explain motives for mixing different types of data, reasoning 
that the findings from one method can assist in developing or interpreting the findings 
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from the other method. Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998) demonstrate that one method can 
be nested within another method so as to offer insight into different units of analysis. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) explain that the objective of mixed methods research 
as a third paradigm is not to replace the quantitative or qualitative paradigms but rather 
to draw from the strengths and weaknesses of both. 
Creswell (2003) explains that a sequential mixed method approach, in which quantitative 
and qualitative data is collected sequentially, is used to elaborate on or expand the 
findings of one method with another method. The author reasons that mixed methods 
research has come of age and that to include only one of the paradigms falls short of the 
mainstream approaches being used today. The mixed methods paradigm forms the 
foundation of the design of this research. 
3.2 Research Design 
The sequential mixed methods research design takes on the form of (1) an event study 
methodology in order to address the first research objective and (2) a personal interview 
approach in order to address the second research objective.  
3.2.1 (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
Quantitative event study methodology is used in order to address the first objective, 
which is to establish whether shares in JSE-listed takeover target companies earn 
abnormal returns in the days preceding the public announcements of planned takeovers.  
A sample of takeovers (of JSE-listed companies) that occurred between July 2004 and 
June 2014 is drawn from the Competition Commission of South Africa’s Merger and 
Acquisition Case List24. 
In line with the research design adopted by Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Mushidzhi and 
Ward (2004) and van der Plaas (2007), this study makes use of share price data in order 
to establish incidences of cumulative abnormal returns (“CAR”) earned through holding a 
                                            
24
 Reference case list source (CCSA, 2014a). 
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share in a company in the 21 trading days preceding the announcement of a planned 
takeover. 25 
The two-factor Black-CAPM is used to calculate expected returns for the shares in each 
target company. The Fama-French three-factor model uses constructed indices 
applicable to equity markets in the USA, and as such would need to be re-constructed 
for application in South Africa’s equity market. In line with the reasoning of Fama 
(1991)26, it is not necessary to complicate the model for estimating short term expected 
returns, and therefore this study will use the two-factor CAPM in line with the majority of 
existing studies which measure expected returns during a short-term event window.27  
Bowie and Bradfield (1993, 1997), Van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) and Correia and 
Uliana (2004) found that the use of broad sectorial indices as market proxies for 
application of CAPM in South Africa offer an increased accuracy in predicting expected 
returns. As such, the sectorial index of each target company is used as the market proxy 
when applying CAPM (although for interest’s sake the All Share Index will also be 
applied as the market proxy).  
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“ACAR”) are used to measure the average 
abnormal return for the sample. As per Smit and Ward (2007), ACAR allows inference on 
the extent to which takeover-related information is priced into JSE-listed target shares 
preceding the publication of such information.  
3.2.2 (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
A qualitative personal interview approach is used in order to address the second 
research objective, which is to resolve whether the occurrences of abnormal returns are 
as a result of legal market activity or if they infer illegal insider trading. 
                                            
25
 In a more recent study, Abraham and Harrington (2013) similarly used a short-term event window. The reason for a short-term 
event window is that an acquiring company commences active engagement with stakeholders in the month before the planned 
takeover announcement. The information pertaining to the impending takeover announcement only becomes certain after an 
acquiring company’s board gives the mandate to its managing executives to pursue the transaction. It is from this time onwards that 
insiders holding such information could benefit from taking a position in the target company. 
26
 Fama (1991) uses the example of takeovers to reason that in instances where a large premium for the target share is offered, then 
the chosen model for calculating expected returns has little impact on the finding of abnormal returns. 
27
 See Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) and van der Plaas (2007) for application of the two-factor CAPM in a 
short term event study. 
- 30 - 
Takeovers in which CAR exceeds 5% in the 21 days preceding the announcement of the 
transaction are selected to form a sub-sample28. The acquiring company associated with 
each individual takeover within the sub-sample of takeovers is identified and contact with 
the company is made. An available member of the acquiring company’s EXCO is 
interviewed. The purpose of the interviews is to resolve whether the occurrences of CAR 
are as a result of legal market activity or if it infers illegal insider trading. 
JSE (2013) explains that the Financial Services Board (“FSB”) Directorate of Market 
Abuse has the mandate of investigating possible instances of insider trading and market 
manipulation. As such the FSB could offer valuable insight into this study. The FSB’s list 
of insider trading and market manipulation cases includes a number of investigations into 
insider trading, some of which include investigations into irregular price movements 
surrounding a takeover announcement29. While the FSB does have a record of 
enforcement in the form of fines for insider trading, there is also a long list of closed 
cases without any explanations given (due to the confidentiality of the investigations). 
The FSB is contacted for a personal interview, with the objective of gaining insight into 
some of the common reasons that investigations into possible instances of insider 
trading are closed. The FSB may be able to explain why they found no evidence of 
insider trading after initially suspecting insider trading on the basis of abnormal returns 
earned during the period preceding a takeover announcement.  
The advantage of using a personal interview approach in order to establish the 
prevalence of insider trading, as opposed to solely a quantitative study as adopted in 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and van der Plaas (2007) is that the former offers the 
opportunity to investigate reasons for the quantitative results and therefore offer broader 
analysis (Creswell, 2003). 
                                            
28
 The purpose of the interview is to obtain insight into the reasons for the abnormal returns. For the purposes of this study, CAR in 
excess of 5% over a 21 day period is deemed material enough to require an explanation for such abnormal returns. 
29
 Insert link to list of cases 
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3.3 Population and sample 
3.3.1 Population 
The population of relevance consists of all JSE-listed companies which are the target in 
a takeover during the 10 year period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2014.  
The population is identified using the Competition Commission of South Africa’s “Merger 
and Acquisition Case List”, which is a Microsoft Excel database available on their 
website (CCSA, 2014a). 
3.3.2 Sample and sampling method 
i. (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
From the population of relevance the sample is drawn as follows:  
 Takeovers are included in the sample if there is adherence to one or more of the 
following criteria: Mergers between listed entities; the acquisition of a significant stake 
in a company listed on the JSE; the buy-out of minority shareholders; or a leveraged 
buy-out of a listed company. 
 The sample is limited to instances where there was at least a 10% premium paid for 
the target company. The rationale of this is based on Smit and Ward (2007), Ascioglu 
and Wood (2002) and van der Plaas (2007) who made similar assumptions based on 
the rationale that if there is no or little premium paid for the target company then there 
is little price sensitive information for an insider to trade on. The premium is 
calculated taking into account the offer price and the 30 day Volume Weighted 
Average Price (“VWAP”) of a target company’s share. 
 The study corrects for confounding events as suggested by McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997). Confounding events include any information that could have a material impact 
on the share price of the target company (i.e. dividend announcements or trading 
updates). The authors adjust for confounding events through omission of data that 
could be exposed to events that could have a material impact on the share price of 
the target company. As such, takeover announcements that were preceded by 
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another material SENS announcement during the event window are omitted from the 
study. 
ii. (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
From the sample a sub-sample is drawn as follows:  
 Takeovers in which CAR exceeds 5% in the 21 days preceding the announcement of 
the transaction are selected to form a sub-sample. 
 The acquiring company associated with each individual takeover within the sub-
sample of takeovers is identified. 
 Contact with the company’s Executive Committee (“EXCO”) is made, in the form of a 
request for a personal interview with a member of the EXCO. 
3.4 The research instrument 
Secondary share price data is collected from INET BFA in order to address the first sub-
problem.  
A semi-structured interview approach is used in order to gain insight into the reasons for 
the existence of abnormal returns preceding the announcement of a takeover. Each 
acquiring company within the sub-sample is interviewed in order to establish if there was 
any legal market activity they are aware of that could explain the existence of pre-
announcement abnormal returns (for example, establishing if the acquiring company 
purchased a stake in the target company in the open market in the days preceding the 
announcement). The semi-structured interview questions are contained in the schedule 
provided in the Appendix H. The advantages of the semi-structured interview allow for an 
adaptive quality and the researcher to explore interesting insights should they arise 
(Creswell, 2003). 
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3.5 Procedure for data collection 
3.5.1 (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
 The population of target companies is selected from the Competition Commission’s 
Merger and Acquisition Case List (“case list”). 
 The case list is filtered as per the sampling method described in section 3.3.2. 
 Once a takeover of a JSE-listed company is identified in the case list, the relevant 
SENS announcement is read in order to establish if there was at least a 10% 
premium over the 30 day Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) offered for the 
shares of the target company. 
 The SENS announcements surrounding the date of the proposed takeover are read 
in order to pinpoint the exact date the public were notified that the target company 
was a target for a takeover. This could be in the form of a specific cautionary 
announcement or a joint notice of a firm intention of the acquirer to make an offer for 
the target shares. 
 A search for confounding SENS announcements during the event window is 
undertaken in order to filter out the takeovers exposed to confounding events during 
the event window. Furthermore, a Google search is undertaken to search for any 
noteworthy news events that could have impacted the target company during the 
event window. 
 Daily share price data of the target company during the event window is retrieved off 
INET BFA. 
 The market proxy inputs for the CAPM calculation of expected returns is retrieved off 
INET BFA. The various market proxies which are retried (daily data from 1 July 2004 
to 30 June 2014): FTSE/JSE All Share (J203), FTSE/JSE Industrials (J520), 
FTSE/JSE Financials (J580), FTSE/JSE Mining (J177), FTSE/JSE SA Listed 
Property (J253), FTSE/JSE Travel & Leisure (J575), FTSE/JSE Platinum & Precious 
Metals (J153), FTSE/JSE Life Insurance (J857), FTSE/JSE Technology (J590), 
FTSE/JSE Nonlife Insurance (J853), FTSE/JSE Industrial Engineering (J275), 
FTSE/JSE Telecommunication (J560), FTSE/JSE Support Services (J279), 
FTSE/JSE Coal Mining (J151), FTSE/JSE Software & Computer Services (J953), 
FTSE/JSE Banks (J835), FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537), FTSE/JSE Equity 
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Investment Instruments (J898), FTSE/JSE Consumer Goods (J530), FTSE/JSE 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (J457), FTSE/JSE Media (J555), FTSE/JSE Food 
Producers (J357), FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235), FTSE/JSE Gold 
Mining (J150), and FTSE/JSE Automobiles & Parts (J335). 
 The beta coefficients for the CAPM are calculated using the CAPM regression tool 
available on INET BFA. Beta coefficients for each company are determined by 
running the regression of the returns for the company against the returns for its 
sectorial index over the 12 month period preceding the event window. The exercise is 
repeated using the All Share index in place of the sectorial index. 
3.5.2 (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
Interviews are held with the acquiring company in each of the takeovers in which CAR 
exceeded 5%. The interviews are pre-arranged interviews with one of the members of 
the acquiring company’s EXCO (directly involved in the takeover). The interview process 
is as follows: 
 The acquiring company’s contact details are retrieved from the company website. A 
telephone call to the investor relations contact point is made, to obtain the email 
details of the relevant and available EXCO member (usually the CEO or CFO). An 
email is sent to the relevant EXCO member, to set up the interview. The interview is 
scheduled (follow up with the EXCO members personal assistant is usually required 
to set up the interview). Where the acquiring company is no longer operational, then 
the relevant EXCO member at the time of the takeover is contacted for an interview.  
 The interviewee is emailed a copy of the Wits Business School ‘Interview Information 
and Consent Form’ for signing prior to the commencement of the meeting (see 
Appendix G for a copy of the form). The interviewee is also sent a copy of the 
interview questions prior to the interview (See Appendix H for a copy of the generic 
interview questions). 
 Interviews are held in the interviewee’s respective offices or otherwise in a coffee 
shop at a convenient location for the interviewee.  
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 The first half of the interview is dedicated to the prepared interview questions 
(Appendix H), and the second half of the interview is used to discuss any unique 
dynamics associated with the takeover that could explain the abnormal returns. 
3.6 Data analysis and interpretation 
3.6.1 Event of interest and event window 
The takeover offer made by the acquiring company for a stake in the target company is 
the event of interest.  
The date on which the first public announcement of the takeover occurred is the event 
date, denoted as “t0”. This is the date that the price sensitive information pertaining to a 
planned takeover became publically available. The event date is either a Firm Intention 
offer announcement30, or an Expression of Interest (EOI) announcement31, or a detailed 
cautionary announcement outlining an approach by a prospective acquirer (whichever 
occurs first). A vague cautionary announcement that makes no reference to any potential 
takeover will not constitute the event date. 
The event window is broken down into three segments: the pre-announcement period 
(21 days before the announcement); the announcement day; and the post 
announcement period (4 days after the announcement).  
3.6.2 Data analysis process (Extent of abnormal returns) 
i. Step 1: Calculating realised returns 
Daily realised returns are derived through computing the capital gains achieved through 
holding an ordinary share each day of the event window. This is denoted by (5) as per 
Mushidzhi & Ward (2004); Jordan, Miller & Dolvin (2012).  
                                            
30
 A Firm Intention offer is regulated in terms of Rule 2.7 of the Takeover Code. Such an offer should only be made after careful 
consideration and when the offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. 
31
 An Expression of Interest (EOI) is an informal offer made by a buyer for the purchase of a business. The primary purpose is to 
suggest a valuation range that a buyer is willing to pay for a company. An EOI is non-binding, usually before a formal due diligence is 
undertaken, after which the prospective buyer may or may not issue a Firm Intention offer. 
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𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 
𝑃𝑗𝑡+1
𝑃𝑗𝑡
 ]                                                                          (5) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑡  = Realised return of share j for period t 
𝑃𝑗𝑡+1 = Price of share j at period t+1; 
𝑃𝑗𝑡  =  Price of share j at period t. 
 
Logarithmic returns are used as they are more likely to be normally distributed and to 
conform to the assumptions of statistical techniques (Strong, 1992). 
ii. Step 2: Calculating expected returns 
Daily expected returns for shareholders in each target company during the event window 
are estimated using the two-factor CAPM, as per (2). 
iii. Step 3: Calculating abnormal returns 
Daily expected returns are subtracted from the daily realised returns in order to derive 
the daily abnormal return earned by shareholders of each target company during the 
event window, as per formula (4) (Ball & Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969). 
iv. Step 4: Calculating cumulative abnormal returns 
The daily abnormal returns are summed in order to derive the cumulative abnormal 
returns (“CAR”) for shareholders of each target company during the event window. The 
formula (6) for CAR is adopted from Smit (2005): 




𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝐾𝐿 =  the CAR for share j from the period t =-21 to t = 5; and 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡   =  the abnormal return for security j for day t, as per (5). 
v. Step 5: Calculating ACAR 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (“ACAR”) for the sample of takeovers is 
calculated. ACAR allows inference on the extent to which takeover-related information is 
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priced into JSE-listed target shares preceding the publication of such information. ACAR 









𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡  =  the average cumulative abnormal return for all shares in the  
sample for the period from t = -21 to t = +5; and 
N =   number of firms in the sample. 
vi. Step 6: Testing for statistical significance 
The sixth and final step of the data analysis process entails using the t-statistic32 to test 
whether each CAR and the ACAR are statistically significant from zero. 
Kothari and Warner (2007, p.11) explain that, 
“For a given performance measure, such as the CAR [and ACAR], a test statistic 
is typically computed and compared to its assumed distribution under the null 
hypothesis that mean abnormal performance equals zero. The null hypothesis is 
rejected if the test statistic exceeds a critical value, typically corresponding to the 
5% or 1% tail region (i.e., the test level or size of the test is 0.05 or 0.01).” 






                                                                           (8) 
Where: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗  (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = CAR of share j starting at time 𝑡1 through to time 𝑡2 
𝜎2(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = Variance of the one-period mean abnormal return.  
                                            
32
 Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and Mushudzhi and Ward (2004) similarly use the t-statistic to test to test for statistical significance. 
van der Plaas (2007) uses the less common bootstrapping technique. 
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3.6.3 Data analysis process (Cause of abnormal returns) 
According to the data analysis of Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Bhana (1987), and van 
der Plaas (2007), the individual instances where a takeover exhibited CAR in the pre-
announcement event window would be indicative of insider trading. Similarly, statistically 
significant ACAR across the sample would be indicative of a significant prevalence of 
insider trading in the JSE.  
The interviews seek to uncover, contrary to the interpretations in the literature mentioned 
above, if there are any instances of legal market activity (including insider trading that 
does not violate the law in South Africa) that have contributed to the CAR and ACAR, 
and therefore resolve whether the occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of 
legal market activity or if they infer illegal insider trading.  
The data analysis procedure follows the data management system prescribed by Miles 
and Huberman (1984). This comprises of three linked sub-processes: data reduction, 
data display, conclusion drawing / verification. During data reduction, the transcripts from 
recorded interviews are condensed into data summaries for analysis. Any specific 
differences and inconsistencies are also highlighted at this stage. A descriptive content 
analysis method is applied to extract themes and contradictions within the data 
(Neuendorf 2002). The reduced set of data is then displayed using text-based matrices 
to assist in interpretation (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  
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CHAPTER 4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
A presentation of the results from the event study is followed by a description of the 
results from the personal interviews. The event study offers evidence on the extent of 
abnormal returns, and the personal interviews provide insight into the cause. A 
discussion and analysis of the results is presented in chapter 5. 
4.2 Results pertaining to (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
57 takeovers from a population of 102 met the criteria for inclusion in the sample (a 10% 
premium to the 30 day VWAP was offered and there were no confounding events during 
the event window). The details of each takeover are set out in Table 1 (Appendix A). 
4.2.1 Realised returns 
Figure 1: Realised Returns vs Benchmark Returns 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the sample’s average daily realised returns relative to benchmark 
returns during the event window. The Realised Returns (black line) constitute the mean 













































Event Window (days) 
Realised Returns JSE ALSI JSE Sector Indices
Market reaction to announcement 
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The JSE ALSI (red line) represents the mean average daily log returns for the All Share 
Index during the event window. The JSE Sector Indices (green line) represents the mean 
average daily log returns for each target company’s sector index during the 
corresponding event window.  
The results establish that on average, a share in a target company earns 10.62% 
cumulative return during the 21 days preceding a takeover announcement, compared to 
cumulative benchmark returns of 2.98% (JSE Sector Indices) and 1.59% (JSE ALSI). 
The steep black line between data point’s t0 and t1 represents the 11.27% (i.e. 21.89% 
less 10.62%) average total return earned by a share in a target company on the day of 
the announcement. This is comparable to the 0.67% benchmark return (JSE Sector 
Indices) on the same day. In the 4 day period after the announcement date, a share in a 
target company earns, on average, 0.29% total return (relative to a 0.24% return for the 
JSE Sector Indices). Table 2 (Appendix B) sets out the average daily realised returns for 
the sample, relative to the benchmark returns. These results are discussed in Ch. 5. 








Figure 2 demonstrates the sample’s average daily Expected Returns. The Expected 
Returns is the average of expected returns for a share in each of the 57 target 
companies during the event window. Expected Returns for each target company is 











































Event Window (days) 
Expected Returns (S) Expected Returns (A)
Figure 2: Expected Returns (Sample Average) 
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indices as the market proxies, and Expected Returns (A) (blue line) making use of the All 
Share Index as the market proxy. 
4.2.3 Abnormal returns 
ARS and ACARS use the JSE Sector Index of each target company as the market proxy 
when determining expected returns, and ARA and ACARA use the All Share Index as 
market proxy. 
ACARS [ACARA] set out in Table 3 (Appendix C) and illustrated in Figure 3 demonstrates 
that abnormal returns of 9.03% [9.96%] accumulate in the 21 days preceding the 
announcement of the takeover.33 
ARS [ARA] of 10.74% [11.32%] occurring on t1 reflect the abnormal returns achieved on 
the day of the announcement (representing the market’s response to the announcement 









                                            
33
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns at the event day constitute abnormal returns up until the event (the opening share price for each day 








































Event Window (days) 
ACAR (S) ACAR (A)
Figure 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Market reaction to announcement 
Price run-up preceding 
announcement 
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4.2.4 Hypothesis testing 
ACARS [ACARA] equals 9.03% [9.96%], which is significantly different from 0 at the 1% 
level. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and do not reject the alternative hypothesis, 
and thus conclude that shares in takeover target companies accumulate significant 
ACAR during the 21 trading days preceding the first public announcement of the 
takeover. 
4.3 Results pertaining to (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
4.3.1 Interview respondents 
Table 4 (Appendix D) contains a breakdown of CAR for each of the 57 target companies 
(CAR before the event; event day AR; and CAR in the 4 days after the event). In 34 of 
the takeovers the target company realised CAR in excess of 5% during the 21 day period 
preceding the announcement of the takeover. These 34 takeovers formed the sub-
sample for the purposes of the personal interviews. Table 5 (Appendix E) presents the 
details of the 34 takeovers that formed the sub-sample.  
Of the 34 takeovers that formed the sub-sample, 26 interview respondents were 
available for personal interviews (respondents were unavailable for 8 of the takeovers). 
Table 5 (Appendix E) presents the breakdown of takeovers which provided interview 
respondents.  
In addition to the 26 aforementioned interviews, the FSB Directorate of Market Abuse 
was interviewed on 4 occasions. 
4.3.2 Interview summaries  
In all 26 interviews, the prepared questions were discussed. The interview questions are 
presented in Annexure G. The notable feedback is summarised below: 
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Q1: Overview of the transaction 
Respondents offered valuable insight into the transaction process, including whom and 
when outside parties were approached in relation to the transaction.  
A common discussion was the fact that the acquiring company informally approaches its 
significant shareholders at an early stage in the takeover planning in order to get an idea 
as to whether the takeover would be supported. Respondents differed on whether such 
shareholders would be classified as insiders at this stage. Several respondents reasoned 
that shareholders who trade on such information are doing so illegally, while others 
reasoned that the at this early stage in the takeover timeline the information is not yet 
price sensitive inside information. The latter group of respondents explained that only 
once the takeover planning moves from the preliminary planning stage to the stage 
where the acquiring company receives approval from its board to pursue the takeover 
does the information become price sensitive inside information according to legislation34.  
The latter group of respondents explained that at the stage when the acquiring company 
receives approval from its board to pursue the takeover then all parties privy to the 
takeover related information are required to sign confidentiality agreements, restraining 
all signatories from trading in the target company.  
The timing of the signing of confidentiality agreements and the associated restraint on 
trade that is placed on signatories was also discussed. Respondents explained that it’s 
not always practical for active institutional investors to sign confidentiality agreements 
whenever a potential takeover target is discussed, as the restraint of trade would put the 
shareholder (especially institutional investors) at a disadvantage, and so for practical 
reasons most institutional investors will not sign a confidentiality agreement until the 
acquiring company obtains board approval to pursue the takeover. 
                                            
34
 Respondents clarified that in order for information to be classified as price sensitive inside information then it needs to be specific 
information and that a “what if” discussion pertaining to a potential takeover target does not constitute specific price sensitive 
information. i.e. the takeover information would only be specific once the acquiring company has made the decision to pursue the 
takeover.  
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Q2: Confirmation of Event Date (Public Announcement Date) 
All 26 respondents confirmed that the takeover was confidential inside information prior 
to the public announcement of the planned takeover.  
For 39 of the 57 takeovers, the event date was the Firm Intention Announcement35. For 
the other 18 takeovers, the event date was the date of the release of a specific 
cautionary announcement pertaining to an Expression of Interest36 submitted to the 
target company’s board (preceding the Firm Intention Announcement).  
Respondents confirmed that the public would not be aware of the planned takeover after 
a vague or “vanilla” cautionary announcement is released, but would be if a specific 
cautionary announcement is released. Respondents agreed that if a vague cautionary 
announcement is released, then the event date is the Firm Intention Announcement, but 
that if a specific cautionary announcement is released then the event date is the date of 
the cautionary.  
This feedback prompted an adjustment to 3 of the 57 takeover event dates. In these 
instances the event date was moved from the Firm Intention Announcement date to the 
prior date of the release of a specific cautionary announcement. Respondents explained 
that in these instances the investors would have been taking a position on the target 
company based on the specific cautionary released. Respondents explained that the 
exact price offered by the acquiring company is not known by the public when the event 
date is the date of a specific cautionary pertaining to an Expression of Interest. 
Q3: Existence of Confounding Events 
Respondents confirmed their agreement that confounding events (i.e. trading update 
released on SENS) would distort the quantitative results and as such takeovers with 
confounding events preceding the event date should be omitted from the study. All 26 
                                            
35
 A Firm Intention offer is regulated in terms of Rule 2.7 of the Takeover Code. Such an offer should only be made after careful 
consideration and when the offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. 
36
 An Expression of Interest (EOI) is an informal offer made by a buyer for the purchase of a business. The primary purpose is to 
suggest a valuation range that a buyer is willing to pay for a company. An EOI is non-binding, usually before a formal due diligence is 
undertaken, after which the prospective buyer may or may not issue a Firm Intention offer. 
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respondents confirmed that there were no confounding events released on SENS or in 
the news during the event window. 
Q4: Open market share purchases (in the target company by the acquiring company) 
preceding takeover announcements 
Respondents explained that there is a difference between “block trades” and “open 
market trades”. Respondents explained that block trades involves “a significantly large 
number of securities being traded at an arranged price between parties outside of the 
open markets”. Block trades by the acquiring company preceding the event date 
occurred in 5 of the 57 takeovers (details of block trades are released on SENS). 
Respondents explained that the block trade will not impact the share’s open market price 
and volume as it actioned outside of the market. Respondents explained that the public 
will only become aware of the block trade in the event of an announcement on SENS. It 
was confirmed that such an announcement is usually accompanied by a specific 
cautionary announcement pertaining to a takeover and that such an announcement 
would constitute the event date. 
Open market purchase of shares in the target company by the acquiring company during 
the event window occurred in 4 takeovers. For all 4, less than a 5% stake was acquired 
in the open market. Respondents confirmed that the public only became aware of these 
open market purchases at the event date as the requirement to notify the public of the 
purchases only arises when 5% or more in the target company is acquired. Further 
investigation of circulars sent to shareholders of each of the 57 takeovers preceding the 
vote on the proposed takeover provided evidence of the open market purchases made 
by the acquiring company. The investigation confirmed that there was such activity for 4 
out of 57 takeovers. 
Q5: Legally Permissible Explanations for Abnormal Returns 
Four different possible “legally permissible” explanations were given by respondents:  
(1) Informed traders speculating of a possible takeover based on the twin release of 
vague cautionary announcements by the target and acquiring companies can cause 
abnormal returns. 13 of the respondents explained that when a vague “vanilla” 
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cautionary announcement is released by both a target company and an acquiring 
company on the same date and within a few minutes of one another then an informed 
investor can speculate that a takeover announcement may be imminent and thus take a 
position on the likely target company. Respondents explained that when the twin vague 
cautionary announcements are subsequently renewed with another vague twin 
cautionary announcement then it exponentially increases the chance of informed 
investors taking positions. The phrase “a trained eye won’t miss it” came up on two 
separate occasions. An inspection of the SENS history of the target and acquiring 
company revealed that 9 of the 34 takeovers that exhibited CAR in excess of 5% could 
possibly be explained by the existence of twin release of vague cautionary 
announcements preceding the event date. 
(2) Open market share purchases by the acquiring company can cause an increase in 
demand for the target company’s shares and thus prompt abnormal returns. 
Respondents involved in the 4 takeovers in which there were purchases of shares in the 
target company by the acquiring company preceding the event date reasoned that these 
purchases would have increased the demand for shares in the target company and thus 
pushed up the price.  
(3) Brokers speculating of possible takeover action after receiving a trade order from the 
acquiring company for purchase of target company’s shares in the open market can 
cause abnormal returns. Two respondents reasoned that if a broker receives such a 
trade order then that broker may suspect the possibility of an impending offer being 
made for all of the shares in the target company. Such brokers may advise their other 
clients to take a long position in the target company based on this speculation. 
(4) The development curve of a newly formed single-asset resources company can result 
in a share price movement that tracks the development curve of the asset rather than 
any index. Two respondents (Mining Company A and Mining Company B) explained that 
the abnormal returns associated with two of the target company’s shares during the 
event window can be explained by this phenomenon. The respondents explained that 
the volatile price movement occurs as the company moves from being an exploration 
company to one which is operating a profitable mine.  
Figure 4: CAR preceding “Mining Company A” takeover announcement 
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The first respondent explained that the CAR prior to the Mining Company A takeover 
announcement illustrated in Figure 4 (above) is explainable by “obvious circumstances”, 
namely the “development curve of the resources asset”. The respondent explained that 
the target company was newly formed (12 months old), with its single asset being a 
platinum mine. The respondent explained that the share price increased in parallel with 
the development curve of the asset rather than as a result of an information leak 
associated with the impending takeover offer. The reasoning was based around informed 
investors taking a position in the company as the mine moves from exploratory to 
operational. The respondent explained that these informed investors are not necessarily 
responding to news associated with the development curve of the mine, but are rather 
taking a speculative position based on their anticipation of imminent news related to the 
operational profitability of the mine. The respondent explained that once the news related 
to the mine’s operational profitability is released for the first time, the share price of the 
company will spike up or down, depending on whether it’s good or bad news, but that 
leading up to this news there is much speculation (and therefore abnormal returns when 
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Figure 5: CAR preceding Mining Company B takeover announcement 
 
The second respondent explained that the abnormal returns associated with the share 
price of Mining Company B illustrated in Figure 5 (above) occurred as a result of 
speculative traders taking a position in anticipation of news related to the profitability of 
its core diamond mine. The respondent explained that the company was exploratory and 
that they were busy with a “bulk-sampling exercise” to determine the prospects of 
operating an abandoned mine. The respondent explained that speculative investors took 
positions in the company in anticipation of the news related to the results of the bulk-
sampling exercise.  
Q6: Information leaks leading to insider trading 
An average of 10 minutes was spent discussing question six. The majority of 
respondents were reluctant to address the question as to whether they knew of any 
specific instances of insider trading based on the takeover related information because 
of the sensitive nature of such a discussion. All 26 respondents felt that information 
pertaining to an impending takeover announcement is impossible to keep 100% 
confidential. The respondents generally perceived a large quantum of CAR to be 
representative of a large number of investors taking positions based on the leak of the 
takeover related information. The respondents reasoned that the information will leak for 
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(1) The large and diverse group that is privy to the information related to the 
impending takeover means that it is very difficult to keep the information 
confidential. Both the acquiring company and the target company will have 
corporate advisory (investment bankers) and legal advisory firms representing 
them. 
(2) There is often more than one bidding company competing to acquire the target 
company. 14 of the respondents referred to one or more competing bidding 
companies who were in discussions with the target company’s board. These 
competing companies are often aware of the fact that there are other companies 
bidding for the target company’s board support for a takeover. 
(3) Should due diligence be carried out prior to the public announcement of a planned 
takeover, then it becomes practically very challenging to keep the possibility of a 
takeover confidential. A due diligence process often involves physical inspections 
of the target company’s assets. Respondents explained that when a known deal 
maker or competitor is seen inspecting a company’s assets with his or her legal 
and corporate advisors, then bystanders would very likely speculate. 
4.3.3 Views of the Financial Services Board (FSB)  
The four interviews with the FSB Directorate of Market Abuse offered further insight into 
the cause of abnormal returns preceding the announcement of a takeover. The 
interviewees explained that the FSB uses instances of abnormal share price movement 
to trigger further investigation, but that abnormal share price movement does not 
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal insider trading. The interviewees offered 
examples of when abnormal share price movements did constitute illegal insider trading, 
and examples of when abnormal share price movements were explainable by normal 
market forces that had nothing to do with insider trading. 
The FSB shared evidence related to a published case where a member of a corporate 
advisory team to an acquiring company told a friend during a game of squash that the 
takeover would be announced imminently. The friend traded on the information through 
his broker, who in turn traded on the information on behalf of 33 other clients, ultimately 
causing abnormal returns prior to the announcement of the takeover. 
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The FSB explained that the majority of investigations into irregular price movements 
preceding the announcement of a takeover were ultimately closed without any evidence 
of illegal insider trading found. The interviewees explained that the majority of cases 
were closed on the grounds that the abnormal price movement was as a result of 
investors taking positions based on their speculation of an impending takeover (nothing 
illegal). The interviewees clarified that informed analysts look out for any hint of an 
impending takeover (i.e. twin cautionary announcements released), and take positions 
accordingly.  
The FSB also explained that illegal insider trading needs to be based on (1) specific 
information that is (2) price sensitive to a known degree. In other words, an investor who 
invests after hearing that a certain company may be a target for a possible takeover is 
not necessarily illegally trading on inside information but could rather be classified as an 
informed speculator. In order for such action to be illegal insider trading then the investor 
would need to know (1) that a takeover offer will be announced and (2) what the offer 
premium is (rendering the information as objectively price-sensitive). 
4.3.4 Implications for Second Hypothesis 
The evidence from the personal interviews suggests that it is challenging to keep 
information pertaining to the impending takeover 100% confidential and that leakage of 
the price sensitive information can result in trading activity that would cause the 
abnormal returns. However, one cannot conclude that evidence of abnormal returns 
preceding the announcement of a takeover offers prima facie evidence of illegal insider 
trading as there is evidence that there exist legal market activity that can, to a certain 
extent, explain the abnormal returns.  
We therefore fail to reject the second null hypothesis, which states that illegal insider 
trading is not the only explanation for CAR preceding a takeover announcement. The 
alternative hypothesis, which states that illegal insider trading is the only explanation for 
cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement, must therefore be 
rejected. 
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4.4 Summary of the results 
Results from the event study indicate that shares in takeover target companies 
accumulate significant ACAR during the 21 trading days preceding the first public 
announcement of the takeover. Results from the 30 personal interviews indicate that 
illegal insider trading is not the only cause of ACAR. ACAR is attributable to a 
combination of both legal market activity and widespread information leaks pertaining to 
the planned takeover announcement.  
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The implication of ACAR in terms of the effectiveness of insider trading regulation is 
discussed, followed by an interpretation of the results in terms of the EMH. The results 
from the personal interviews are discussed in terms of their implications regarding the 
case of abnormal returns. 
5.2 Discussion pertaining to (1) Extent of Abnormal Returns 
5.2.1 Effectiveness of insider trading regulation 
Myburgh and Davis (2004) found a perceived decrease in incidence of insider trading in 
South Africa and Ojah et al. (2008) reasoned that a decrease in insider trading in South 
Africa was attributable to enforcement of insider trading regulations. Assuming a link 
between quantum of ACAR and occurrence of insider trading as per findings of van der 
Plaas (2007), one could expect to see a decrease in the quantum of ACAR since the 
enforcement of insider trading regulation in South Africa. 
Table 6: Comparison of ACAR among studies 
  
ACAR% # Days Period Sample size Country 
Study Results 9.03% 21 2004 - 2014 57 RSA 
Mushidzhi and Ward (2004)  3.87% 10 1998 - 2002 49 RSA 
van der Plaas (2007)  8.00% 21 2000 - 2005 30 RSA 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) 13.26% 126 1975 - 1978 194 USA 
In Table 6 (above) the ACAR leading up to the takeover announcement is compared to 
the results from previous studies. The methodology for estimating expected returns and 
computing abnormal returns used in Muschidzhi and Ward (2004) and Keown and 
Pinkerton (1981) are comparable to that adopted in this study (use of the two-factor 
CAPM to determine expected returns). The methodology in van der Plaas (2007) was 
the same bar the use of control portfolios as market proxies.  
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Of interest is the fact that ACAR in this study exceeds ACAR findings in van der Plaas 
(2007) and Mushidzhi & Ward (2004), both of which were based on periods that would 
not have fully benefitted from the effects of enforcement of insider trading regulation. 
This suggests that the enforcement of insider trading regulations has not resulted in a 
decrease in the incidence abnormal returns in shares of a target company preceding the 
announcement of a takeover. Either there is an insignificant link between ACAR and 
insider trading, or insider trading regulation has been ineffective in reducing occurrence 
of insider trading in South Africa. 
5.2.2 Implications for Market Efficiency 
Table 7: Abnormal Returns & Market Efficiency 
Benchmark CAR (Before) AR (Event) CAR (After) 
Sector Indices 9.03% 10.74% 0.91% 
ALSI 9.96% 11.32% 0.86% 
i. Semistrong-form efficiency 
Table 7 (above) indicates that on average, a share in a target company earns 10.74% 
[11.32%] abnormal returns on the day of the announcement of a takeover. In the 4 days 
thereafter CAR is 0.91% [0.86%]. These results are fairly consistent with Jensen’s (1978) 
definition of semistrong-form market efficiency, which holds that share prices rapidly 
adjust to publicly available new information such that no excess returns can be earned 
by trading on that information.  
However, this interpretation is based on averages of the 57 investigated takeovers. 
Table 4 (Appendix D) contains details of CAR for each of the 57 takeovers. For several 
of the takeovers there is evidence of material positive / negative CAR in the 4 days after 
the announcement. While this may suggest that semistrong-form market efficiency 
doesn’t always hold, this interpretation should be made with caution. The occurrences of 
material CAR after the event date can be somewhat explained by the fact that in these 
instances the event date was a specific cautionary announcement rather than a Firm 
Intention announcement. When the event date is a specific cautionary the public would 
not have known the exact price to be offered for the target company and as such the 
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quantum of market reaction would have been based on a degree of speculation (hence 
the continued speculation after the initial reaction). Where the event date was a Firm 
Intention announcement the lack of CAR in the 4 days after the announcement is 
indicative of semistrong-form market efficiency. 
i. Strong-form efficiency 
Table 7 (above) indicates that, on average, the market reaction to the announcement 
constitutes a total of 19.77% ACAR when combining ACAR from t-21 to t1. 9.03% of the 
ACAR occurs before the announcement is made, and 10.74% of the ACAR occurs on 
the day of the announcement. This means that 45.7% of the 19.77% ACAR associated 
with the takeover announcement is reflected in the share price prior the announcement. 
In terms of Fama’s (1970) strong-form efficiency, stock prices must reflect all information, 
both public and non-public. In other words insider information would need to be fully 
exploited by insiders in order for non-public information to be reflected in the price of a 
share (Jensen, 1978). The results indicate that 54.3% of the market reaction to the 
information only occurred after the information became public. This indicates that the 
private information was not fully exploited by insiders, suggesting that strong-form 
efficiency does not hold. 
5.3 Discussion pertaining to (2) Cause of Abnormal Returns 
5.3.1 Abnormal Returns caused by legal market activity 
i. Skilled analysts and legally informed traders 
Comment (1986) argued that the prospect of large takeover premiums and the many 
kinds of clues legally available to market participants assures the existence of an active 
market for trading based on prospective takeover targets. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 
similarly argued that the occurrence of abnormal returns preceding the announcement of 
a takeover is consistent with capital markets anticipating the acquisition of a target firm 
rather than insider trading. These arguments are consistent with the findings from this 
study in relation to the 13 respondents who explained that informed traders (skilled 
analysts) speculate on potential takeover targets when they see the twin release of 
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vague cautionary announcements by the target and acquiring companies. Analysis of 
SENS records uncovered 9 takeovers in which CAR could possibly be explained by the 
existence of twin cautionary announcements which were released by the target company 
and acquiring company preceding the event date. This evidence is consistent with the 
views of the FSB interview respondents, who explained that the majority of investigations 
into irregular price movements are closed because the cause can be explained by 
informed traders taking positions based on their speculation of an impending takeover.  
ii. Open market acquisitions by acquirer 
There is no prior research that was found which documents the possibility of open 
market share purchases by the acquiring company causing an increase in demand for 
the target company’s shares before the market is informed of the activity. The findings in 
this study in relation to the 4 takeovers in which there were purchases of shares in the 
target company preceding the event date offers a possible cause of the abnormal returns 
associated with these 4 takeovers. However, the degree to which these open market 
transactions can account for CAR is unknown. One could argue that the purchases 
would have had some impact from a supply / demand perspective, although the quantum 
of all four purchases was less than 5% of the total issue of the target company’s shares, 
suggesting that it may not fully account for CAR. 
iii. Broker speculation 
No previous research was found that offers insight into the possibility of brokers 
speculating on possible takeover action after receiving a trade order from the acquiring 
company for purchase of target company’s shares in the open market. It is difficult to 
quantify what impact such activity would have in terms of CAR, although it must be noted 
that this explanation would only offer insight into 4 of the 34 takeovers in the sub-sample. 
Regardless of the quantum of its impact, such speculation by brokers could be classified 
illegal insider trading given that one could argue that it is price-sensitive information and 
therefore confidential in terms of insider trading regulation. For this reason this 
explanation alone does not constitute a legal market action which could explain ACAR.  
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iv. Development curve of single-asset resources company 
In two of the interviews, the respondents explained that the abnormal price movement 
occurs as the market anticipates imminent news in relation to the company’s progress 
from an exploration company to a profitable operator. In terms of Fama’s (1965) EMH, 
changes in share prices occur as a result of investors pricing new information into the 
value of share. One could challenge the validity of the explanation provided by the 
respondents on the grounds that the SENS records show that there was no information 
released during the period preceding the announcement of the takeovers and therefore 
nothing for investors to base the increased price on. However, the respondents reasoned 
that investors were speculating on the likelihood of new information in relation to the 
development curve of the asset. Further quantitative investigation may offer further 
evidence with which one can better test this explanation. i.e. Do other single-asset 
resources companies exhibit a similar return profile when an exploratory resources 
company is busy with “bulk-sampling exercises” in order to determine the profitability of a 
potential mine?  
5.3.2 Abnormal Returns caused by illegal insider trading 
The finding of abnormal returns caused by legal market activity contradicts the notion 
that existence of CAR constitutes prima facie evidence of illegal insider trading. While an 
abundance of literature interprets the existence of CAR as prima facie evidence of illegal 
insider trading (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981; Jayaraman, Mandelker & Shastri, 1991; 
Bhana, 1987; van der Plaas, 2007), these quantitative studies base much of their 
interpretation on assumptions rather than observations.  
However, the finding of abnormal returns caused by legal market activity does not mean 
that there cannot also be a degree of abnormal returns caused by illegal insider trading. 
All 26 respondents were of the opinion that information pertaining to an impending 
takeover announcement is impossible to keep 100% confidential and as such the 
existence of CAR is attributable to information leakage to the majority of research 
analysts and institutional investors. The respondents reasoned that the information will 
often leak as a result of (1) the quantum and diversity of insiders involved in takeover 
negotiations; (2) the existence of more than one prospective acquirer; and (3) the public 
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nature of a physical due diligence process. This is in line with the reasoning for abnormal 
returns provided by the industry practitioner J. William Robinson in Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981, p.3), “You start with a handful of people, but when you get close to doing 
something the circle expands pretty quickly. You have to bring in directors, two or three 
firms of lawyers, investment bankers, and everybody’s got a secretary. If the deal is a big 
one, you might need a syndicate of banks to finance it. Every time you let in another 
person, the chance of a leak increases geometrically.”  
5.4 Conclusion 
The plausible examples of legally permissible explanations for ACAR contradict the 
notion that ACAR constitutes prima facie evidence of insider trading. This does not mean 
that there cannot also be a link between ACAR and insider trading. The evidence from 
the interviews suggests that ACAR is caused by a combination of legal market activity 
and widespread leakage of information related to the impending takeover 
announcement. While ACAR does not constitute prima facie evidence of insider trading, 
it does offer an indication that an information leakage is likely to have occurred. Thus the 
existence of significant ACAR casts doubt on the effectiveness of insider trading law in 
preventing the widespread leakage of price-sensitive inside information. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusions of the study 
The study established that shares in a sample of 57 JSE-listed takeover target 
companies earn ACARS [ACARA] of 9.03% [9.96%] in the 21 days preceding the public 
announcements of planned takeovers. We reject the first null hypothesis and conclude 
that shares in target companies accumulate significant ACAR during the 21 trading days 
preceding the first public announcement of the takeover.  
The extent of ACAR in this study exceeds the extent of ACAR in Mushidzhi & Ward 
(2004) and van der Plaas (2007). This is surprising considering that the increased 
enforcement of insider trading regulation since these studies. 
The study resolved that occurrences of abnormal returns occur as a result of a 
combination of legal market activity and illegal insider trading (due to widespread 
information leaks).  
Respondents offered plausible examples of legally permissible explanations for ACAR. 
These plausible explanations contradict Keown & Pinkerton’s (1981) assumption that 
ACAR constitutes prima facie evidence of insider trading. We therefore fail to reject the 
second null hypothesis, and conclude that illegal insider trading is not the only 
explanation for cumulative abnormal returns preceding a takeover announcement. 
While ACAR does not constitute prima facie evidence of insider trading, it does offer an 
indication that information leakages are likely to have occurred. The evidence from the 
personal interviews suggests that it is challenging to keep information pertaining to the 
impending takeover 100% confidential and that leakage of the price sensitive information 
can result in trading activity that causes abnormal returns. Thus the existence of 
significant ACAR highlights the need for further investigation into the effectiveness of 
insider trading regulation in preventing the widespread leakage of price-sensitive inside 
information preceding the announcement of planned takeovers. 
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6.2 Recommendations 
The findings from this study could offer insight to the FSB and JSE in their efforts to 
protect uninformed investors. An investigation into implementing a regulatory 
requirement for a target company to release a specific cautionary immediately after 
receiving an approach from a prospective acquirer is recommended. The prevalence of 
information leakages suggest that there exist information asymmetries among investors 
within the parameters of the current JSE listing requirements and as such the review of 
the cautionary requirements would be of value. At the moment the JSE listing 
requirements include that a cautionary must be released, but there is no mention on 
whether the cautionary must be specific or merely vague and “vanilla”.  
The results demonstrate that while abnormal returns preceding a takeover 
announcement do not constitute prima facie evidence of insider trading, it does offer an 
indication of possible insider trading based on a leakage of inside information. The FSB’s 
tracking of return profiles of takeover targets preceding the announcement of a takeover 
is therefore a recommended tool to identify individual cases for further investigation. 
6.3 Suggestions for further research 
An event study testing the semistrong-form EMH in the period after a Firm Intention 
announcement is recommended. At the time of a Firm Intention announcement the 
market would be made aware of the offer price, and thus the efficiency with which the 
market reacts to this new information can be tested. While the results from this study 
demonstrated that semistrong-form EMH almost holds, the sample was distorted by 
takeover announcements in which no specific price was announced. 
Further research comparing ACAR preceding the following two scenarios is 
recommended: (1) a target company releases a specific cautionary immediately after 
receiving an approach from a prospective acquirer, versus (2) a target company releases 
a vague “vanilla” cautionary and then only informs the market of the approach in a later 
specific announcement (event date). CAR associated with individual takeovers in this 
study suggest that ACAR preceding scenario (1) is less than ACAR preceding scenario 
(2), but such findings would need to be tested with greater precision. Such research may 
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offer further insight to the FSB and JSE in terms of regulatory requirements pertaining to 
cautionary announcements related to takeovers. 
Another avenue for further research in terms of insider trading preceding takeover 
announcements on the JSE is related to the extent to which there is abnormal equity 
derivative trading activity preceding takeover announcements. Notwithstanding the value 
of such research, the researcher would still be posed with the question of whether 
evidence of abnormal derivative activity preceding a takeover announcement constitutes 
prima facie evidence of insider trading. As such, further research into establishing the 
link between any form of abnormal trading activity – be it equity price analysis, derivative 
trades, or equity volume analysis – and insider trading is recommended. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 1 
Table 1: Sample Details 
# Target Company Acquiring Company 
Announcement 
Date 
1 Acucap Properties Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd 14-Apr-14 
2 Sycom Property Fund Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd 14-Apr-14 
3 Kerry Group Ltd Adcorp Holdings Ltd 03-Apr-14 
4 Control Instruments Group Ltd Torre Industrial Holdings Ltd 12-Dec-13 
5 Wits Gold Resources Ltd Sibanye Gold Ltd 11-Dec-13 
6 B&W Instrumentation & Electrical Ltd Elb Group Ltd 04-Nov-13 
7 AFGRI Ltd AgriGroupe Holdings (Pty) Ltd 27-Sep-13 
8 Kagiso Media Ltd Kagiso Tiso Holdings (Pty) Ltd 10-Sep-13 
9 Allied Technologies Ltd Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 17-May-13 
10 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd The Bidvest Group Ltd 22-Mar-13 
11 Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd The Bidvest Group Ltd 28-Nov-12 
12 Cipla Medpro SA Ltd CIPLA India 21-Nov-12 
13 Cape Empowerment Ltd Management Buy-Out 06-Nov-12 
14 Hardware Warehouse Ltd Steinhoff Doors & Building (Pty) Ltd 26-Sep-12 
15 Avusa Ltd Mvelaphanda Group Ltd 12-Jun-12 
16 Ceramic Industries Ltd Italtile Ltd 28-May-12 
17 O-Line Holdings Ltd OBO Bettermann  22-Feb-12 
18 Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. 05-Jan-12 
19 IQuad Group Ltd Sasfin Holdings Ltd 12-Sep-11 
20 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd Glencore International AG & Lexshell 26-Aug-11 
21 Vox Telecom Ltd Lereko Metier & Investec 14-Jul-11 
22 Paracon Ltd Adcorp Holdings Ltd 06-Jul-11 
23 Metorex Ltd Jinchuan Group Ltd 05-Jul-11 
24 Universal Industries Corporation Ltd Ethos Private Equity 27-May-11 
25 Metorex Ltd Vale S.A. 08-Apr-11 
26 Freeworld Coatings Ltd Kansai Paint Co Ltd 14-Dec-10 
27 Glenrand M.I.B Ltd Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd 09-Dec-10 
28 Dimension Data Ltd Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. 15-Jul-10 
29 CIC Holdings Ltd Imperial Holdings Limted 13-Jul-10 
30 a.b.e. Construction Chemicals Ltd Chryso Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd 25-May-10 
31 Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd Dynamic Cables RSA Ltd 08-Dec-09 
32 Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd Old Mutual Plc 14-Oct-09 
33 TWP Holdings Ltd Basil Read Holdings Ltd 11-Aug-09 
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34 Celcom Group Ltd Management Buy-Out 15-Dec-08 
35 Enviroserv Holdings Ltd Absa Capital Private Equity      05-Aug-08 
36 Liberty Holdings Ltd Standard Bank Group Ltd 27-May-08 
37 Bytes Technology Group Ltd Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 24-Oct-07 
38 Tiger Automotive Ltd Ethos Private Equity 18-Oct-07 
39 Ellerine Holding Ltd African Bank Investments Ltd 21-Aug-07 
40 Diamond Core Resources Ltd BRC Diamond Corporation 04-Jun-07 
41 Brandcorp Holdings Ltd Ethos Private Equity 25-Apr-07 
42 Eland Platinum Holdings Ltd Xstrata Plc 12-Apr-07 
43 Barplats Investments Ltd Eastern Platinum Ltd 01-Mar-07 
44 CBS Property Portfolio Ltd Public Investment Corporation 02-Feb-07 
45 Primedia Ltd Red Pen 2 General Trading (Pty) Ltd 10-Jan-07 
46 Peermont Global Ltd Opalton Investments (Pty) Ltd 11-Oct-06 
47 Paramount Property Fund Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd 20-Oct-06 
48 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd Bain Capital 17-Oct-06 
49 Metboard Properties Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd 27-Feb-06 
50 Venfin Ltd Vodafone Holdings SA (Pty) Ltd 03-Nov-05 
51 Connection Group Holdings Ltd JDG Group Ltd 01-Aug-05 
52 Bridgestone Firestone Maxiprest Ltd Bridgestone SA Holdings (Pty) Ltd 27-Jul-05 
53 Aflease Gold & Uranium Ltd Southern Cross Resources Inc.   05-Jul-05 
54 Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd Liberty Group Ltd 02-Dec-04 
55 Grintek Ltd SAAB South Africa (Proprietary) Ltd   10-Nov-04 
56 United Services Technologies Ltd Supply Solutions Ltd 29-Oct-04 
57 Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd SABMIller Plc 21-Jul-04 
- 73 - 
APPENDIX B: TABLE 2 
Table 2: Realised Returns (vs Benchmarks) 
t Sample All Share Sectors 
-21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
-20 -0.07% -0.04% -0.05% 
-19 0.35% -0.11% -0.08% 
-18 0.28% 0.18% 0.17% 
-17 -0.37% 0.09% 0.21% 
-16 -0.15% -0.09% 0.18% 
-15 1.08% -0.03% -0.28% 
-14 -0.19% 0.06% 0.01% 
-13 0.84% 0.16% 0.08% 
-12 1.26% -0.06% 0.09% 
-11 0.34% 0.07% 0.21% 
-10 0.36% 0.37% 0.35% 
-9 0.52% -0.05% 0.11% 
-8 1.04% 0.20% 0.28% 
-7 0.29% 0.08% 0.10% 
-6 0.14% 0.05% 0.18% 
-5 0.18% 0.34% 0.06% 
-4 0.83% 0.14% 0.28% 
-3 0.69% 0.16% 0.24% 
-2 0.88% 0.18% 0.43% 
-1 1.22% 0.00% 0.22% 
0 1.11% -0.10% 0.20% 
1 11.27% 0.10% 0.67% 
2 1.07% 0.33% 0.31% 
3 -0.51% 0.15% 0.15% 
4 0.70% 0.20% 0.37% 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 3 
Table 3 presents the sample’s average daily Abnormal Return and the Average 
Cumulative Abnormal Return. ARS and ACARS use the JSE Sector Index of each target 
company as the market proxy when determining expected returns, and ARA and ACARA 
use the All Share Index as market proxy. 







t ARS ARA ACARS ACARA 
-21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
-20 -0.12% -0.01% -0.12% -0.01% 
-19 0.42% 0.46% 0.30% 0.45% 
-18 0.10% 0.21% 0.40% 0.65% 
-17 -0.66% -0.47% -0.26% 0.18% 
-16 -0.24% -0.09% -0.50% 0.09% 
-15 1.29% 1.16% 0.79% 1.25% 
-14 -0.16% -0.26% 0.63% 1.00% 
-13 0.81% 0.79% 1.44% 1.78% 
-12 1.25% 1.21% 2.69% 2.99% 
-11 0.31% 0.48% 3.00% 3.47% 
-10 0.34% 0.20% 3.34% 3.68% 
-9 0.57% 0.47% 3.91% 4.15% 
-8 0.92% 0.98% 4.83% 5.13% 
-7 0.21% 0.09% 5.04% 5.22% 
-6 0.05% 0.18% 5.09% 5.40% 
-5 0.11% 0.16% 5.20% 5.56% 
-4 0.82% 0.90% 6.02% 6.46% 
-3 0.53% 0.59% 6.54% 7.05% 
-2 0.62% 0.71% 7.16% 7.76% 
-1 0.92% 1.06% 8.08% 8.82% 
0 0.94% 1.14% 9.03% 9.96% 
1 10.74% 11.32% 19.77% 21.28% 
2 1.01% 1.02% 20.78% 22.30% 
3 -0.66% -0.57% 20.12% 21.73% 
4 0.59% 0.57% 20.71% 22.30% 
5 -0.03% -0.16% 20.67% 22.14% 
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APPENDIX D: TABLE 4 
Table 4: CAR per takeover 
# Target Company 
CAR      
Before Event 
AR         
Event Day 
CAR        
After Event 
1 Eland Platinum Holdings Ltd 66.10% 8.01% 1.30% 
2 B&W Instrumentation & Electrical Ltd 37.28% 33.09% 1.04% 
3 Control Instruments Group Ltd 30.51% 8.45% 0.36% 
4 Aflease Gold & Uranium Ltd 26.23% -5.64% 0.28% 
5 TWP Holdings Ltd 25.88% 9.52% -0.94% 
6 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd 24.67% 3.77% 7.39% 
7 CIC Holdings Ltd 23.56% 9.35% -3.64% 
8 United Services Technologies Ltd 22.55% 4.15% 2.02% 
9 a.b.e. Construction Chemicals Ltd 19.37% 11.57% 0.41% 
10 Connection Group Holdings Ltd 18.87% 10.51% 0.71% 
11 Barplats Investments Ltd 17.54% 10.39% -0.07% 
12 Diamond Core Resources Ltd 16.94% -0.12% -0.25% 
13 Metorex Ltd 16.72% -0.79% -0.30% 
14 Kelly Group Ltd 16.36% 6.70% 0.54% 
15 O-Line Holdings Ltd 16.04% 4.09% 0.07% 
16 AFGRI Ltd 15.14% 12.48% 0.30% 
17 Enviroserv Holdings Ltd 15.10% 12.88% 0.33% 
18 Glenrand M.I.B Ltd 11.57% 5.29% 0.08% 
19 Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd 11.51% 6.52% 1.10% 
20 Metorex Ltd 11.16% 7.77% -0.99% 
21 Cipla Medpro SA Ltd 10.60% 9.52% 1.88% 
22 Freeworld Coatings Ltd 9.77% 10.67% 0.04% 
23 Witws Gold Resources Ltd 9.16% 27.64% -6.18% 
24 Venfin Ltd 8.35% 23.31% -1.70% 
25 Bridgestone Firestone Maxiprest Ltd 7.83% 9.46% -0.58% 
26 Ceramic Industries Ltd 7.49% 11.79% -0.04% 
27 Paracon Ltd 7.38% 1.56% 0.11% 
28 Peermont Global Ltd 6.91% 1.76% 2.03% 
29 Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd 6.79% 10.95% -1.28% 
30 CBS Property Portfolio Ltd 5.94% 0.13% 0.19% 
31 Bytes Technology Group Ltd 5.82% 12.54% 1.13% 
32 Primedia Ltd 5.68% 14.00% 0.19% 
33 Acucap Properties Ltd 5.50% 3.69% 1.58% 
34 Metboard Properties Ltd 5.50% 8.42% 1.27% 
35 Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd 4.83% 12.61% 0.04% 
36 Brandcorp Holdings Ltd 4.78% 10.11% 0.66% 
37 IQuad Group Ltd 4.15% 16.49% -0.19% 
38 Mutual & Federal Insurance Co. Ltd 3.21% 17.04% 0.11% 
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39 Paramount Property Fund Ltd 1.67% 4.06% 1.16% 
40 Sycom Property Fund Ltd 1.60% 7.72% 5.44% 
41 Vox Telecom Ltd 1.46% 12.46% -0.05% 
42 Dimension Data Ltd 1.42% 1.96% 0.14% 
43 Tiger Automotive Ltd 1.25% 4.17% 0.08% 
44 Avusa Ltd 0.74% 8.37% 0.76% 
45 Hardware Warehouse Ltd 0.63% 18.01% -0.51% 
46 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 0.33% 8.48% 0.36% 
47 Ellerine Holding Ltd 0.31% 13.83% 1.50% 
48 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd -0.53% 8.78% 0.15% 
49 Cape Empowerment Ltd -0.71% 23.89% 0.47% 
50 Grintek Ltd -1.22% 19.44% 0.43% 
51 Kagiso Media Ltd -1.81% 15.55% 0.42% 
52 Universal Industries Corporation Ltd -2.05% 11.86% 0.12% 
53 Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd -2.96% 18.47% 0.76% 
54 Liberty Holdings Ltd -3.53% 18.78% 0.23% 
55 Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd -12.76% 16.04% 1.68% 
56 Celcom Group Ltd -14.44% 15.30% 0.46% 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 5 
Table 5: Sub-Sample Interview Respondents 
# Target Company Acquiring Company Interview 
1 Eland Platinum Holdings Ltd Xstrata Plc Yes 
2 B&W Instrumentation & Electrical Ltd Elb Group Ltd Yes 
3 Control Instruments Group Ltd Torre Industrial Holdings Ltd Yes 
4 Aflease Gold & Uranium Ltd Southern Cross Resources Inc.   Yes 
5 TWP Holdings Ltd Basil Read Holdings Ltd Yes 
6 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd Glencore International AG & Lexshell No 
7 CIC Holdings Ltd Imperial Holdings Limted Yes 
8 United Services Technologies Ltd Supply Solutions Ltd Yes 
9 a.b.e. Construction Chemicals Ltd Chryso Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd Yes 
10 Connection Group Holdings Ltd JDG Group Ltd Yes 
11 Barplats Investments Ltd Eastern Platinum Ltd Yes 
12 Diamond Core Resources Ltd BRC Diamond Corporation Yes 
13 Metorex Ltd Vale S.A. No 
14 Kelly Group Ltd Adcorp Holdings Ltd Yes 
15 O-Line Holdings Ltd OBO Bettermann  No 
16 AFGRI Ltd AgriGroupe Holdings (Pty) Ltd Yes 
17 Enviroserv Holdings Ltd Absa Capital Private Equity      Yes 
18 Glenrand M.I.B Ltd Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd Yes 
19 Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd The Bidvest Group Ltd No 
20 Metorex Ltd Jinchuan Group Ltd No 
21 Cipla Medpro SA Ltd CIPLA India Yes 
22 Freeworld Coatings Ltd Kansai Paint Co Ltd Yes 
23 Witwatersrand Gold Resources Ltd Sibanye Gold Ltd Yes 
24 Venfin Ltd Vodafone Holdings SA (Pty) Ltd Yes 
25 Bridgestone Firestone Maxiprest Ltd Bridgestone SA Holdings (Pty) Ltd Yes 
26 Ceramic Industries Ltd Italtile Ltd Yes 
27 Paracon Ltd Adcorp Holdings Ltd Yes 
28 Peermont Global Ltd Opalton Investments (Pty) Ltd No 
29 Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd Liberty Group Ltd No 
30 CBS Property Portfolio Ltd Public Investment Corporation No 
31 Bytes Technology Group Ltd Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd Yes 
32 Primedia Ltd Red Pen 2 General Trading (Pty) Ltd Yes 
33 Acucap Properties Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd Yes 
34 Metboard Properties Ltd Growthpoint Properties Ltd Yes 
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 8 
Table 8: Sector Indices 
# Target Company Index Name 
1 Acucap Properties Ltd FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property (J253) 
2 Sycom Property Fund Ltd FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property (J253) 
3 Kerry Group Ltd FTSE/JSE Support Services (J279) 
4 Control Instruments Group Ltd FTSE/JSE Automobiles & Parts (J335) 
5 Witwatersrand Gold Resources Ltd FTSE/JSE Gold Mining (J150) 
6 B&W Instrumentation & Electrical Ltd FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235) 
7 AFGRI Ltd FTSE/JSE Food Producers (J357) 
8 Kagiso Media Ltd FTSE/JSE Media (J555) 
9 Allied Technologies Ltd FTSE/JSE Mobile Telecommunications (J657) 
10 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (J457) 
11 Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Consumer Goods (J530) 
12 Cipla Medpro SA Ltd FTSE/JSE Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (J457) 
13 Cape Empowerment Ltd FTSE/JSE Equity Investment Instruments (J898) 
14 Hardware Warehouse Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
15 Avusa Ltd FTSE/JSE Media (J555) 
16 Ceramic Industries Ltd FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235) 
17 O-Line Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235) 
18 Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Banks (J835) 
19 IQuad Group Ltd FTSE/JSE Support Services (J279) 
20 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Coal Mining (J151) 
21 Vox Telecom Ltd FTSE/JSE Telecommunication (J560) 
22 Paracon Ltd FTSE/JSE Software & Computer Services (J953) 
23 Metorex Ltd FTSE/JSE Mining (J177) 
24 Universal Industries Corporation Ltd FTSE/JSE Industrial Engineering (J275) 
25 Metorex Ltd FTSE/JSE Mining (J177) 
26 Freeworld Coatings Ltd FTSE/JSE Industrials (J520) 
27 Glenrand M.I.B Ltd FTSE/JSE Nonlife Insurance (J853) 
28 Dimension Data Ltd FTSE/JSE Technology (J590) 
29 CIC Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Support Services (J279) 
30 a.b.e. Construction Chemicals Ltd FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235) 
31 Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd FTSE/JSE Equity Investment Instruments (J898) 
32 Mutual & Federal Insurance Company Ltd FTSE/JSE Nonlife Insurance (J853) 
33 TWP Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Construction & Materials (J235) 
34 Celcom Group Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
35 Enviroserv Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Support Services (J279) 
36 Liberty Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Life Insurance (J857) 
37 Bytes Technology Group Ltd FTSE/JSE Technology (J590) 
38 Tiger Automotive Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
39 Ellerine Holding Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
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40 Diamond Core Resources Ltd FTSE/JSE Mining (J177) 
41 Brandcorp Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
42 Eland Platinum Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Platinum & Precious Metals (J153) 
43 Barplats Investments Ltd FTSE/JSE Platinum & Precious Metals (J153) 
44 CBS Property Portfolio Ltd FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property (J253) 
45 Primedia Ltd FTSE/JSE Media (J555) 
46 Peermont Global Ltd FTSE/JSE Travel & Leisure (J575) 
47 Paramount Property Fund Ltd FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property (J253) 
48 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
49 Metboard Properties Ltd FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property (J253) 
50 Venfin Ltd FTSE/JSE Financials (J580) 
51 Connection Group Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE General Retailers (J537) 
52 Bridgestone Firestone Maxiprest Ltd FTSE/JSE Consumer Goods (J530) 
53 Aflease Gold & Uranium Resources Ltd FTSE/JSE Mining (J177) 
54 Capital Alliance Holdings Ltd FTSE/JSE Financials (J580) 
55 Grintek Ltd FTSE/JSE Industrials (J520) 
56 United Services Technologies Ltd FTSE/JSE Industrials (J520) 
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APPENDIX G: INTERVIEW INFORMATION & CONSENT FORM 
The Graduate School of Business Administration 
University of the Witwatersrand 
2 St David’s Place, Parktown,  
Johannesburg, 2193,  
South Africa 
PO Box 98, WITS, 2050 
Website:   www.wbs.ac.za  
 
MM FINANCE & INVESTMENT INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM  
INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM   
 
Who I am 
My name is Justin Mitchell. I am conducting research for the purpose of completing my Master of Management in 
Finance and Investment at Wits Business School. 
 
What I am doing 
I have conducted the first part of my research and found that shares in JSE-listed target companies often earn 
abnormal returns in the days preceding the public announcement of a planned takeover. It is unclear (academically) 
whether these occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of a) explainable legal market activity or b) trading in 
the target shares by parties in possession of “leaked” information pertaining to the planned takeover announcement. 
My study aims to resolve whether the occurrences of abnormal returns are as a result of “legal market activity” or if 
they otherwise infer the “leakage of information in relation to the takeover”. 
 
Your participation 
I am asking you whether you will allow me to conduct one interview with you. If you agree, I will ask you to 
participate in one interview for approximately one hour. I am also asking you to give me permission to tape record 
the interview. I tape record interviews so that I can accurately record what is said. 
 
Please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The 
choice of whether to participate or not, is yours alone. If you choose not take part, you will not be affected in any way 
whatsoever.  If you agree to participate, you may stop participating in the research at any time and tell me that you 
don’t want to continue. If you do this there will also be no penalties and you will not be prejudiced in any way.  
 
Confidentiality 
Any study records that identify you will be kept confidential. The records from your participation may be reviewed 
by people responsible for making sure that research is done properly, including my academic supervisor/s. (All of 
these people are required to keep your identity confidential.)   
 
All study records will be destroyed after the completion and marking of my thesis. I will refer to you by a code 
number or pseudonym (another name) in the thesis and any further publication. 
 
Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns  
This research has been approved by the Wits Business School. If you have any complaints about ethical aspects of the 
research or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please contact the Research 
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CONSENT 
 
I hereby agree to participate in research on the “Effectiveness of Insider Trading Law in South Africa’s Equity 
Market: The Mergers and Acquisitions Example”. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced 
in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop participating at any point should I not want to continue and that 
this decision will not in any way affect me negatively. 
 
I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally in the immediate 
or short term. 
 




Signature of participant                               Date:………………….. 
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APPENDIX H: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
        
The Graduate School of Business Administration 
University of the Witwatersrand 
2 St David’s Place, Parktown,  
Johannesburg, 2193,  
South Africa 
PO Box 98, WITS, 2050 
Website:   www.wbs.ac.za  
 
MM FINANCE & INVESTMENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
Discussion Questions: [Acquiring] & [Target] transaction 
1. Please will you provide an overview of the transaction and the process that [Acquiring] 
undertook in planning and executing the transaction? 
2. Was the transaction confidential inside information prior to its announcement via SENS on 
[date]? i.e. Was there an announcement prior to the [date] SENS announcement which 
resulted in the planned transaction being anticipated by the market? 
3. Are there any confounding events (i.e. dividend announcement) that you are aware of that 
may have caused changes in prices of the shares of [Target] in the 21 trading days preceding 
the announcement via SENS on [date]? 
4. Did [Acquiring] purchase any shares in [Target] during the 21 trading days preceding the 
announcement via SENS on [date]? If so, 1) how many? 2) Was this purchase information 
made public? 
5. Please will you provide an explanation for the existence of abnormal returns in [Target] 
preceding the [date] SENS announcement. Are you aware of any possible legally permissible 
reasons for the abnormal returns? 
6. Is it possible that the price-sensitive information may have been obtained by persons who 
may have traded on the information, in the 21 trading days preceding the announcement via 





- 83 - 
APPENDIX I: GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION PER TAKEOVER 
# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Listed Property)
- 84 - 
# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Listed Property)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Support Services)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Sector)
- 87 - 
# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Gold Mining Sector)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Construction)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Food Producers)
- 90 - 
# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 














































Event Window (days) 





































Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Media)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Technology)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Pharmaceuticals)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Consumer Goods)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Pharmaceuticals)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Equity Investments)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE General Retailers)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 















































Event Window (days) 





































Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Media)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Construction & Materials)
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Construction & Materials)
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Coal Mining)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Telecommunications)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Sector Indices)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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Event Window (days) 
CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs Sector Indices)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Industrial Engineering)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Mining)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Industrials)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Nonlife Insurance)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Technology)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Support Services)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Construction & Materials)
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# Target Company Acquiring Company Announcement Date 
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Construction & Materials)
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CAR (vs ALSI) CAR (vs JSE Platinum & Precious Metals)
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